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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LETHEA R. FREDRICKSON,
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I

Case No.
7452

Brief of Respondent
___:,

Appellants have, in their statement accentuated
points which they feel should have influenced the court
and jury but did not do so, and have skimmed over or
neglected to state evidence which was material to plaintiff's case and which was believed by the jury.
This is a law case and the questions raised by the
appeal are as to whether there was any substantial
evidence to go to the Jury; whether the court erred
1
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in its instruction on the measure of damages; and in
ruling on one question relating to the right of cros~
examination. The instructions of the court with reference to determining the issues of duty, violation of
duty and negligence are not in question. Defendant
concedes them to correctly state the law of this case.
In ruling on a motion for non-suit or directed
verdict the evidence is considered in the most favorable light to plaintiff's case. After verdict and judgment the facts ~are presumed to be as claimed by plaintiff. All conflicts are resolved in favor of the verdict
unless the plaintiff failed to make a case. This court
is, therefore, not interested in determining the weight
of the evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence is the
question.
Let us therefore take a look at the evidence as
it stood at the end of plaintiff's case; and again as
it stood at the end of the trial, bearing in mind that
all conflicts are resolved in favor of plaintiff by the
verdict of the jury and, for the purpose of considering
such motions, by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(a) At the conclusion of plaintiff's case.
(b) At the conclusion of the case.
(a)

Mrs. Fredrickson testified that prior to the 6th
day of July, 1945, she was in good health excepting
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.-·

tH

~e ~

~

that one of her knees was stiff. She had never had
any trouble with her throat or sinuses (R. 81). She
had consulted Dr. Boucher of .Murray about her knee.
She went to the Intermountain Clinic by 1appointment
on that date to see about her knee. She had a physical
examination and was directed to Dr. Maw. l-Ie recommended the removal of her tonsils. He said there
was nothing wrong but there was pus in the right
tonsil. Dr. Tyndale then told her it might help her
arthritis ( R. 83). She decided to have her tonsils out,
received an appointment with Dr..Maw, and reported
on July 17, 1945 for the operation. They put her in
bed, it was dark, and the doctor had a light (R. 85).
He gave her a local anesthetic and proceeded to take
out her tonsils. He used cotton and ~auze. The operation took about an hour (R. 86); she was told to return
in about three weeks for a check-up (R. 87). During
that time her throat was sore, she couldn't swallow
anything. She returned as directed; Dr. Maw was on
vacation; she saw the nurse who looked at her throat,
said it was all right. She told the nurse she was having
difficulty in swallowing, and "it feels like there is a
lump in n1y throat" (R. 88). She was not told to come
back. She paid the bill for the operation (R. 89). A
week or ten days ~after that her throat was terrific,
always sore, so she called on the phone and asked for
Dr. Maw, was told that he was busy, was asked what
she wanted, and told the nurse her throat was sore
and wanted to know what to do. She heard the nurse
tell Dr. :Maw that it was Mrs. Fredrickson and that
she had an ulcer in her throat. She was told to como
3
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1n (R. 90), which she did. Dr. Maw looked at her
throat, washed out her nose, said there was some
drainage from her tonsil area and head, and prescribed
a mouth wash. He didn't tell her to come back (R. 91).
About every three weeks or every month after that
she went to see Dr. Maw for about a year and a half
(R. 92). She was in distress and he just gave her
sinus treatments. All of this time her throat was sore.
She went to the Clinic last on June 29, 1948. During
this time she also went to see Dr. Boucher, her family
doctor (R. 93), because her throat was sore, 'and Dr.
Maw wasn't doing her any good. He prescribed penicillin. She also went to see her dentist, Dr. Wright.
He examined her mouth but did nothing. He referred
her to a physician, Dr. Johnson. He examined her
mouth and prescribed suHa and penicillin (R. 95). She
then had Dr. \Vright take out eighteen front teeth (R.
96). This was in January 1946. He did not take out
any rear teeth. They had been taken out years ago.
Dr. Wright did not use any packs in her mouth. He
did not use any absorbent cotten in her mouth (R. 97).
He did not pl'ace any fabric materials of any kind in
her mouth. He did no work in the rear of her mouth
(R. 98). She then went back to Dr. Boucher because
her throat was sore and there was an ulcer right in the
hole of the tonsil (R. 99). Dr. Wright gave her some
dentures but they hurt her terribly. Every place in
her mouth there were sores and everything. He sent
her back to Dr. Boucher for penicillin. Dr. Boucher
sent her to Dr. Moorehead. At that time the ulcer was
clearing up so he examined for sinus. Dr. Wright
4
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made another set of dentures but they couldn't be
used (R. 100). The gun1s wouldn't heal. She went
back to Dr. Moorehead but he did nothing for her .
She then went to Dr. Browning· (R. 101) to see if he
could find out what was the matter. Her mouth was
more or less sore all the time. Sometimes it would
heal up and then another ulcer would break out. There
was no tin1e when she wasn't in pain. Up to this time
the only doctor or dentist who did any work in her
mouth was Dr. \Yright. She went to Dr. Browning
in July 1947.

~
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Dr. Browning took x-rays (R. 102), after which
he opened up the gums just a little bit to the left of
center and cleaned out the infection and three days
later made the correction. He did not use any packs,
gauze, or cotton in her mouth (R. 103), nor did he
do any surgery in the rear of her mouth, or in the
throat or on the palate or around the tonsil area. Dr.
Sears was also there. Dr. Browning removed the
dentures. They hurt. A couple of weeks afterwards
ulcers began to show up again. Her mouth was sore.
In October 1947 she went back to Dr. Wright. Her
mouth and throat were in terrible condition. There were
ulcers on sides, down in the throat, in the tonsil area
and along side of her tongue (R. 104).

.,OOL.'.I
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She then saw Dr. Argyle, a ·physician In Murray.
He prescribed penicillin (R. 105). She then went back
to Dr. Browning; he did nothing. She went to Dr.
Maw again the same day that she saw Dr. Browning.
There was an ulcer on her tongue; Dr. Hatch was
5
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also there. He took a sample for a test to be sent to
the L.D.S. Hospital. She asked him what he meant,
"Is it cancer~" He said, (R. 106) "I wouldn't say
it is. It doesn't look good." She went back two or
three days later and saw Dr. Maw and Dr. Hatch.
Dr. Maw told Dr. Hatch, "Mrs. Fredrickson has complained about her throat ever since she had her tonsils pulled." Dr. Hatch said they should take a biopsy
and give her some penicillin (R. 107). He asked if
she had seen any other doctors ·and she said she had
seen Dr. Browning that morning. He said, "Don't
go around showing everybody your mouth. You come
back here and let Dr. Maw take care of it.'' She went
back to Dr. Maw that afternoon and two days later.
He medicated the throat, said it looked better and
said, "I don't believe it is cancer." She went back
to Dr. Argyle for penicillin shots and he sent her
to Dr. Cowan and Nielse.n as he thought (R. 108) it
might be a cancer. They told her it wasn't cancer;
that it was purely infection coming out of the tonsil hole.
Dr. Argyle treated her all that winter for infection of the mouth, gave her hormone shots, penicillin
shots ~nd mouth wash (R. 109).
None of these doctors except Dr. Browning did any
surgery or cutting in her mouth.
During May 1948 she saw Dr. Sears. She had a big
sore in her mouth (R. 110). He and Dr. Browning
looked at it and sent her 'to Dr. Dolowitz, a throat
specialist, whom she saw about May 10, 1948. He took
6
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a biopsy to send to the Holy Cross Hospital, gave her
some medicine and told her to come back in a couple
of days (R. 111). The condition of her throat was
terrible. There was a great big ulcer about the size
of a dime on the left side just above the tonsil area.
She went back per ;appointment, but Dr. Dolowitz
did nothing more then (R. 112). She went back to
Dr. Dolowitz on June 24, 1948 and Dr. Dolowitz took
another biopsy.
On June 26, 1948 at about 9:30 A.M. she had a
terrible ulcer on the left side just above the tonsil
area. She was washing it off with peroxide and water
trying to get a little easement of it 'and it just po~ped
open and she could see something hanging. She took
a tweezers and pulled on it and there was this ungodly
ragged thing dripping with pus. It was terrible. It was
sticking out. She washed it off (R. 113) It looked like
a piece of gauze or white material about three-fourths
of an inch long 'and about a quarter of an inch wide.
She was frightened. She was hysterical and tried to
get it out. She tried with her fingers and the tweezers
but couldn't get it out and then went to her neighbors
to call her friend Mrs. Matthews and then to her
daughter- in -law, Betty Fredrickson, and then to
Dr. Dolowitz, accompanied by her daughter-in-law (R.
115). We had to wait about an hour and a half to
two hours to see him. He cleaned out the hole with
penicillin and sprayed it. She thought the gauze was
still there but evidently she had swallowed it, and all
that was left was fragments. He picked out some

7
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strings and showed them to her. He prescribed 'penicillin every eight hours. She returned to Dr. Dolowitz
and he would take out threads every time.
When she got home she wondered if she had swallowed the gauze and (R. 117) afterwards recovered
it from the stool. She put it in some water in a fruit
jar (R. 118) and finally in some alcohol. It has been
in her possession ever since until delivered to her
attorneys recently.
Dr. Dolowitz put no packs, gauze or cotton in her
mouth (R. 119).
Exhibit "A" is a bottle containing some material
that came out of an ulcer on the left side of her mouth
at her home. The ulcer would break and these pieces
and fragments would stick out (R. 120). She put them
in alcohol.
(It was stipulated that they have not been disturbed by h,er attorney and the exhibit ·was admitted
without objection.)
Exhibit "B" contains material that came from the
ulcer on the left side of the mouth. (Admitted without
objection.)
Exhibit "C" is material from the same ulcer on
the left side (R. 122). (Admitted without objection).
Exhibit "D" from
(Admitted.)

the same ulcer

(R. 123).

8
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Exhibit .. E'' frmn
(Admitted.)

the same ulcer

( R. 124).

Exhibit "F" contains material that, on November
8, 1948, appeared in an ulcer on the right side of the
throat, at her hon1e. rrhere \Ya~ a bad ulcer there, about
the size of a garden pea ; it broke and this rna terial
came out; she S\Yallowed it and it was recovered the
next day frmn the stool (R. 125). (Admitted without
objection.) There are some other materials in bottles
that she recoYered in the same \Yay.
Prior to June 17, 1945 she weighed about 160
pounds. She lost weight thereafter, about 60 pounds
(R. 126). Her mental condition was terrible; she was
nervous; she was sick after her tonsils were taken out;
she didn't know what was the matter; nobody else
knew what was the matter; she went from doctor to
doctor until the family got disgusted with her; they
thought it was all imagination and regarded her as
off mentally and wouldn't let the grandchildren come
to see her; she was humiliated and embarrassed (R.
127) ; and then these ulcers broke in her mouth and
she was ashamed to go around the children because
she would stink; she could taste it; when she went
any place she would sit by herself and wouldn't go
around people; her people ignored her; they figured
there was something wrong but didn't know what it was.
When it was suggested that she had cancer shf~
felt that she might just as well commit suicide. After
9
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June 1948 she felt much better. Her (R. 128) mind
began to clear.
The material that was recovered on June 29, 1948
was ·put in the bottle marked Exhibit "A" (R. 130)
and then turned over to Mr. Elton, her attorney.
The ulcers that she saw would appear and disappear
during the past three years (R. 146). One ulcer on
the left side ·was just above the tonsil area and the
other one on the left side was down in the tonsil area
( R. 147). The one on the right was near the cheek,
right down back of that tonsil (R. 148). It came out
of the hole and spread on to the tongue. The one on
the left was just above the tonsil.
These strings came out of her mouth from June
28 (1948) until about a month before trial (R. 150).
Dr. Wright has been her dentist since 1935 (R.
156). She doesn't remember what dentists extracted
teeth for her before that. Between 1935 and January
1946 she had teeth filled and cleaned but couldn't say
if she had any pulled. In January 1946 she had only
18 teeth, 10 at the bottom and 8 on the top; (or vice
versa) (R. 157). They were all front teeth. By January 1946 she had lost all of her teeth except her front
teeth. She didn't remember whether any teeth were
extracted between 1935 and January 1946. Dr. Wright
was the only dentist that treated her during that time.
Since 1935 she has just had Dr. Wright as her
dentist (R. 159) until Dr. Browning in July 1947. Dr.
Sears makes teeth ; did no work in her mouth.

10
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Frmn 1935 her doctors have been Dr. BouchPr,
family doctor, then Dr. Moorehead. She was sent to him
by Dr. Boucher: Dr. :Maw; Dr. Argyle in October 1946 ,
(R. 160). Dr. Boucher was the only doctor (medical)
who treated her between 1935 and July 1945; and then
Dr. Johnson of Murray. right after Dr. Boucher; then
Dr. :J[oorehead: and then back to Dr. Boggess who had
taken Dr. Boucher's place (R. 161), then Dr. Argyle;
then Dr. Nielsen of Cowan & Nielsen; and of course
Dr. Dolowitz (R. 162). Dr. Boucher is retired now.
He lives in California. She went to Dr. Boggess for
her throat (R. 163). Dr. Nielsen limits his practice to
cancers and tumors. All of the doctors she mentioned
except Dr. Boucher are still in Salt Lake County.
i.,.

During these four years she has gone from one
doctor to another (R. i64). To all of these doctors she
complained about her throat following her tonsillectomy
in July 1945-nothing but that. She told all of these
doctors everything, that she had had a tonsillectomy
and had a sore throat throat ever since.

[;

In her deposition, taken in this case, she testified
that she couldn't say how many teeth Dr. Wright had
extracted between 1935 and July 5, 1945. She would
say two or three at most (R. 166). She didn't know,
maybe there weren't any. He didn't extract any of
the very front teeth prior to July 5, 1945. The back
ones were extracted thirty years ago, more or less
(R. 163) .

·~
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The first time she saw Dr. Maw after the operation
was the middle of August (R. 171). She expected to have
11
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a sore throat following the operation. Thereafter she
saw Dr. Maw about every three weeks. When her throat
got so bad she couldn't stand it she would go back to
him (R. 173). She didn't go to see Dr. Argyle until
she discontinued seeing Maw. She could get no relief
from the Clinic and she had to go somewhere. These .
doctors gave me penicillin and sulfa. They could see
the soreness there and so could she.
Dr. Wright used no sponges, gauze, or packs in
her mouth (R. 174). He made some dentures but her
gums were so sore she couldn't use them (R. 175). He
made two sets. She had these ulcers. Her whole mouth
was sore (R. 177); her whole face was sore inside.
Dr. Browning used no gauze (R. 179). She also
visited Dr. Calvert (a dentist). He referred her to Dr.
Sears.
The contents of the bottle, "Exhibit "I", have
been removed now. They were what was recovered in
the stool on the first occasion (R. 200).
MRS. VERA MATTHEWS
She is a friend of Mrs. Fredrickson, has seen her
often, at frequent intervals (R. 242). Between her tonsil operation and the summer of 1946 she had an
extremely sore throat. She went down to one hundred
pounds. She also observed Mrs. Fredrickson's mental
condition. She was depressed a lot and sick a lot of
mental trouble in that way, this sickness was upsetting
her health to that extent (R. 243).

12
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On June 26, 1948 she saw l\[rs. Fredrickson, at
home of witness, looked into her mouth; she saw this
cotton or gauze hanging out of her throat, about onefourth of an inch wide, it looked about half an inch
long, that resen1bled gauze to her (R. 244) on the left
side of her throat. From the middle of 1948 her health
improved (R. 245), physically and mentally; she is
more cheerful. She is acquainted with gauze. Her
whole mouth and gums were sore in 1946. She understood that the reason she had her teeth out was because
she had this soreness in her throat and it would help
her arthritis (R. 250). It is her experience that people
have their teeth pulled for things like that.
l\Irs. Fredrickson started having trouble with her
gums and mouth immediately after having her tonsils
out.
MRS. RUPP
She lives in Taylorsville (R. 256), knows Mrs.
Fredrickson, is a close and intimate friend. Saw her on
June 26, 1948. On that date saw her at home of witness;
looked in her mouth ; she acted like she was sick. She
had a sore in the back of her mouth that was all red
and pussy looking (R. 258), and it looked to have a
piece of gauze hanging from this hole in her mouth;
it looked like an awful bad sore. It looked about a
quarter of an inch wide and half an inch long. She
knows gauze.

13
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SHERMAN FREDRICKSON
Husband of plaintiff. Talked with Dr. Maw in
April or May 1948. Asked Dr. Maw if the condition
of her throat was a cancer. He said he didn't think
it was. Asked if the trouble in her throat had any
chance of affecting her mentally; he said no, he didn't
think it would. Asked Dr. Maw what was really the
matter of her throat and he couldn't tell me. He said,
"She do.es have a sore throat'' (R. 260).
Observed his wife's condition between tonsillectomy
and summer of 1948. She was irritable, lost weight;
she was 'Practically a nervous wreck.
Has also observed her health from the summer of
1948 to the present. She has gained weight, her nerves
are much better; her mental attitude toward life in
general is better.
His wife had no trouble with her teeth prior to
the tonsillectomy (R. 263). She had had some teeth
removed several years ago, twenty years, probably
twenty-five years.
Dr. Wright didn't remove any of her teeth that
he knew of. He didn't remove any teeth until he took
out the eighteen.
She had eighteen teeth removed because of a bad
condition in her throat (R. 265).
Dr. Wright did not put any packs or gauze in her
mouth (R. 268) or any fabric or other material.
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BETTY FREDRICKSON
Daughter-in-law of plaintiff (R. 271). Has known
her since 1939, close relationship. After tonsil operation she had sores, ulcers, running sores in her mouth,
and showed them to witness from time to time; they
were pussy (R. 273). They showed up at various places,
around in the throat and around the gums and into
the sides. She had arthritis and after the tpnsillectomy
she got relief from that. During the year 1945 to
June 1946 she lost a lot of weight and looked very
bad. Her children noticed it ( R. 27 4). We were all
concerned about her mental condition. She was in (}
bad state. She was very nervous and had a horror of
being dependent (R. 275) upon anyone to take care
of her.
She saw plaintiff on June 26, 1948. Plaintiff drove
to her house. Plaintiff opened her mouth and she looked
and could see a large pussy spot and what a'Ppeared
to be a piece of gauze in it (R. 276). She observed
some foreign materials, some threads and with a
definite loose weave (R. 277), gauze. She was familiar
with surgical gauze. It was a small piece, maybe slightly
smaller than your finger tip. There was just a small
tip showing, maybe around a quarter of an inch or
half an inch (R. 278). It was still imbedded in the
mouth. It was just above the tonsil area. Dr. Dolowitz
brought out some tissue and threads.
Between 1945 and June 1948 there had been an
increase in plaintiff's nervousness, perpetual worrying
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caused by her condition; wondering what was causing
it and if she would ever get better; there was a definite
strain in her relations to her husband and she lost
weight (R. 282). During that time there was one sore,
one infection after another in her throat and in her
mouth (R. 283). The sore that she saw on July 26,
1948 was about three-quarters of an inch in diameter
(R. 285). It was at the back of the throat. She couldn't
remember which side. It was less than an inch from
the center ( R. 286).
MR. McLACHLIN
City Chemist since 1920 (R. 297). Identified Exhibit "1" as a bottle that he received from attorney
for plaintiff to make an analysis of the contents. I
found there were small strings or solids or fibers of
cotton. There appeared to be a substance similar to
catgut, which he didn't have time to definitely determine. He took the fiber out that was in the bottom,
boiled it with sodium hydroxide to determine whether
there was animal matter other than cellulose and then
stirred that with potassium iodide and iodine to get
a color reaction for cotton and it showed positive, and
he then put it under the microscope and compared it
with other pieces of cotton gauze, and the reactions
were similar all the way through (R. 298).
His conclusion· was that it was cotton and that
there was also a substance similar to catgut.
Most of the material in the bottle was used in the
examination.
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He didn't see any fragments of bony substance.
DR. BRO,VNING
Knows the plaintiff; treated her July 7, 21 and 25,
1947 (R. 303); took x-rays and on July 21st the lower
anterior ridge \\·as opened. There \Vas a very spiney
sharp ridge which was removed, making a smooth surface, because she was having difficulty in wearing her
dentures. It was from the left bicuspid to the right
bicuspid; from the first double tooth to the first double
tooth on the opposite (R. 303). She had no other
teeth at that time ( R. 304).
In doing that work he used no packs of any kind.
Used no sponges. He used some sutures of dyed,
black silk. No other foreign materials. An aspirator
was used to remove the blood and keep the surface
clear (R. 305).
On July 25, 1947 he opened up the upper are,..a
from the first molar to the first molar and curetted
it but it wasn't bad; it wasn't like the lower. Also
cleaned out the socket of the first molar. No pack,
sponges or gauze were used, no sutures in the upper.
X-rays taken show no bone fragments or spicules of
bone (R. 306).
He never used any catgut in his work in plaintiff':3
mouth (R. 307). The silk sutures were removed in
three to five days. He did no work in the rear of her
mouth. Did no work in the area of the wisdoin teeth.
17
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She was in his office many time complaining
about a sore mouth, over a period of a year, probably
once a month. Her mouth was very inflamed. At one
time he saw a lesion near the very back edge of the
soft palate (R. 312). The tonsil area was involved in
the inflammation that he saw. It extended clear back
to the uvula (R. 3.13). The ulceration that he saw, which
caused the inflammation was not removed from the
tonsil area. The distance is not too much, you are over
the tonsil area ( R. 314). It was on the left, to the soft
palate covering the tonsil area.

DR. WRIGHT
A dentist of Murray, Utah (R. 329). Mrs. Fredrickson known him since the fifth month of 1939. She
has had no molar teeth since he has known her.
On January 22, 1946 he extracted eighteen teeth
for her. They were all anterior (front) teeth. Did not
use any gauze or packs in her mouth. They were easy
to take out, no dry sockets. Cotton packs or gauze
packs are used only in the case of bleeders (R. 331)
-not on the day the teeth are taken out but only if
they come back as a bleeder. He has gauze in his
office ; also cotton.
About three months before January 22, 1946 she
went to his office and said she was having trouble
and wondered if it was from her teeth (R. 339). He
told her he didn't figure the teeth were causing her
trouble, and then she came in and said she wanted her
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teeth out. Her teeth were too bad to leave in and too
good to take out so he left it up to her ot decide. He
told her they n1ight be causing the trouble but didn't
think so. There was some pyorrhea, slight (R. 340).
His records show that in 1939 he put in a filling.
In 1940 he cleaned her teeth. In 1942 he cleaned her
teeth; in 1943 he x-rayed her teeth; in June 1944 he
put in two fillings; in August 1944 he put in a filling.
DR. DOLOWITZ
He is a physician S'pecializing in eye, ear, nose and
throat (R. 182); met Mrs. Fredrickson on May 10,
1948 ; the lymphoid tissue in the nasal pharnyx was
red and angry looking (R. 184); in the mouth there
was a small lesion about a c.m. quare at the junction
of the hard and soft palate on the left side ( R. 185) ;
a small ulcer with a pussy exudate. It would be about
two-thirds of the way to the tooth from the anterior
pillar (R. 186); on the illustration it would be the
last upper tooth (R. 187); on May 14, 1948 he made
an examination of her throat; there was still a good
sized ulcer which seemed to be slightly closer to the
gum, because of the biopsy which he took at the previous
time to find whether or not cancer was present at the
site of the lesion. On May 29, 1948 the ulcer had healed
and there was one behind the gum, behind the teeth
(R. 188) on the soft palate, about half an inch below
the last tooth on the left side (using the exhibit as a
reference). On June 24, 1948 the first ulcer was still
present and he removed the whole ulcer, at the request
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of the pathologis-t, to take a deep biopsy, very deeply,
to be sure no cancer was in the tissue ; the ulcer had
healed but broke down again (R. 189).
On June 26th Mrs. Fredrickson came with a small
abscess opposite the last lower molar. She stated it
had ruptured and a sluff of dry blood and cotton came
out. She brought a thread with her about an inch
long, the sluff was about an inch in diameter with a
c.m. deep, slightly less than half an inch (R. 189).
On June 28th she came and stated that a large
piece of gauze had started to come out of the hole, she
was unable to remove it and had swallowed it. There
was a hole with a few pieces of string which she removed. There were three or four strings (R. 190).
On July 1st the socket had healed but not well.
He opened it and removed six tiny threads. I saw her
off and on at frequent intervals from time to time.
On October 25, 1948 he saw her; there was a slightly
granulate, healing formation on the left side, just lateral
to the tonsil fossa, the deep cavity which goes in here
where the tonsil rests.
There were two lesions when he saw her on N ovember 15, 1948; there was a slight healing of the wounds
on the right side over the tonsil area (R. 191), midway
between the right anterior pillar and the last tooth.
There was some granulation at the first site and there
was one thread which exuded there.
20
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He saw her the following day, N ovmnber 16, 1948.
The S\Yelling had spread around to the rheek side, just
behind the first tooth and I removed a thread from
. there. She had no natural teeth.
"\Yhen she first arrived he suspected cancer and
took tissue, then a deeper biopsy. "\Yhen the thread
exuded he tried to find what it was. The ulcer healed
from the bottom up instead of the top which meant
to keep the top open or they would have a pocket again.
He prescribed penicillin (R. 193). The anterior pillar
of the tonsil area is the front pillar. The tonsil area
is about three-quarters of an inch wide (R. 198) at
the bottom. Tonsils vary tremendously in size (R. 199).
In our average adult tonsils are from one inch and a
quarter to three-quarters of an inch wide. They are
from three-eighths of an inch to half an inch thick.
They are slightly wider and thicker than an almond
nut (R. 200). He indicated on Exhibit "1" with a red
circle the approximate location of the ulcer that he
saw on May lOth. He said he was guessing at the location and that it was an approximation (R. 202). The
circle which he placed on the diagram is closer to the
normal position of the rear molar than the front pillar
of the tonsil ( R. 206).
He marked on the exl).ibit the location of the ulcer
that he saw on May 14th, slightly closer to the gurn
(R. 207). It was the same ulcer but larger as he took
part of it in the biopsy (R. 208).
When he saw her on May 29th there was another
ulcer. He identified it with a "3" on the exhibit. It
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was about a half c.m. to a c.m. below the last tooth
on the left side (R. 211).
On June 24th the first and second ulcers had reopened and recurred, and he took another biopsy.
On June 26th there was a small abscess interposed
between '' 1 '' and '' 2 '' on the diagram. An abscess
is imbedded deeper in the tissue. This abscess was
about one c.m. in diameter (R. 213). It had ruptured
and she had pulled out a slough of dried blood and
cotton. He saw no gauze. He saw a thread that Mrs.
Fredrickson had.
On June 28th she told me she had seen a piece of
gauze and that she had pulled on it and had lost it
(R. 215) and she was extremely frightened. On that
occasion he removed a few more pieces of string (R.
216). The abscess was deeper. In July he found six
threads. When he saw the threads he felt it wasn't cancer, something was irritating deeper, foreign pieces,
threads ( R. 217).
On July 29th an ulceration broke out on the right
side, almost in the same position on the opposite side
of the mouth, a little bit lower (R. 217). It was marked
with a "4" on the exhibit. Mrs. Fredrickson insisted
the feeling of gauze but he couldn't see any (R. 219).
September 16th ulcer "4" was still drawing pus
(R. 220). On September 23rd a small white hard mass
worked out to the surface of the ulcer and it was
removed by biopsy forceps under local anesthesia, it
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looked like cartilage with a small green core next to it
of infected mater·ial (R. 221). Cartilage is found in various parts of the body, uot around or in the teeth. It is
found in the region of ulcer No. 4.

On November 16th the swelling In the mouth had
spread to her teeth, where the teeth would normally
be found. There was a small ulcerated area coming
level with the left buckle surface, a small granulation
was removed with a thread in the center (R. 223) right
in the area of the teeth. It was marked on Exhibit
"1" with a "5".
He never saw threads or gauze excepting as indicated but Mrs. Fredrickson told him some came from
No. 4 ulcer and there was an enlarged ·perforation there
(R. 225 ).
(This is the evidence which should have been and
was considered by the trial court in ruling on the motion for non-suit.)
(b)

The following admissions and additional facts
favorable to plaintiff appeared by evidence of defendants.
DR. MUIRHEAD
Saw plaintiff on April 5, 1946 (R. 377). She complained of pain, discomfort and some swelling of her
throat from an operation last fall.
23
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He would be shocked and surprised to find that
Bhortly thereafter there exuded from that area a quantity of cotton and catgut (R. 378). In the light of his
examination he would be very much surprised to find
that condition existing (R. 379).

DR. MAW
He described a tonsil operation. He opens up the
whole cavity of the tonsil. When the operation is first
done there is of course an indentation, the muscles
haven't reacted; this is all muscle cavity when the tonsil is taken out.
The patient, the nurse and Dr. l\1aw were the only
ones that were ·present (R. 388). His recollection is
that a sister of Mrs. Fredrickson was at the foot of
the bed.
He used gauze sponges in this operation on ~Irs.
Fredrickson (R. 389). Exhibit "3" is the type. In
cases of quite severe hemorrhage he uses that size.
If there is just a little oozing he cuts it in smaller
pieces and touches the fossa and catches the bleeder
and ties it off with catgut (R. 390). In every local
there is a certain amount of bleeding. He fastens the
sponge to the hemostat and sponges it off.
If the patient spits blood, if it should be that he
cuts a large vessel, he takes a large sponge pack in
her throat, holds it for a few minutes with the instrument, gradually takes it down to see where the bleeding
is, ties it with catgut, and if there is another wipes it
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off and proceeds the same until all are tied off ( R.
39:2). He doesn't recall whether there was a largE~
amount of bleeding in the operation on ~lrs. Fredrickson.
Exhibit "5" is the type of catgut that was used
on Mrs. Fredrickson ( R. 395).
The tonsil is in a little capsule and when you takf~
the tonsil out sometimes a piece of the root of the
tonsil will be through the capsule into the muscle and
you can't see it, and it may grow. You check to see
that all is removed (R. 396).
As many as twelve to fifteen of these little sponges
may be used in an operation.

He instructed Mrs. Fredrickson to stay home during
the period of convalescence. He did not see her again,
she did not call him, and he presumed everything was
all right (R. 397). He left Salt Lake on August 1st
and returned August 9th. He saw her on August 18th.
It had practically healed ( R. 398).
On September 4th, 1945 she complained of sore
throat; pharnyx was inflamed. This area is in the back
of the throat, behind the back pillar of the tonsil (R.
407-408).
She complained of a sore throat every time she
came in, and he saw nothing except that chronic inflamed
pharnyx (R. 409).
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On October 3, 1946 she complained of a dry sore
throat, especially on the right side (R. 411). He gave
her sulphathyazol.
On October 28, 1947 she complained of pain about
her second and third molar tooth on the right side (R.
412). He could see nothing that was causing her di;~
comfort. He told her to go see her dentist.

When Mrs. Fredrickson first came to him in July
1945, her sinuses were clear. There was no abscessed
sinus in her case. She did not manifest or disclose to
him any prior operation in her throat (R. 403). No
surgery in her throat. Exce'!pt for her infected tonsil
the throat tissue appeared to be normal.
He was shown Exhibit "F", which one of his witnesses said was a mass of threads, and asked if it was
undigested food material.
''I think I remember seeing this ; I couldn't say it
it thread. My gauze is a lot larger than this. I was
looking for gauze; this looks like cotton to me; cotton
threads." Now it looks lik'e cotton threads.
There is a way by which it can be determined
whether this is undigested food. He can check it, surely.
It was his opinion when he gave his deposition
that if Mrs. Fredrickson wanted a cure she should
go to her dentist; that her troubles were dental (R. 472).

"Q. Yes and had not Dr. Dolowitz taken that deep
biopsy during June of 1948 which released that foreign
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substance that throat condition would have continued
much longer than it did, would it not, Dr. Maw Y
••A. You spoke of the tonsil fossa. He never made
an opening in the tonsil fossa. He made an opening
possibly the third molar tooth-not the tonsil fossa,if you want me to answer that.
Doctor, he placed it about half an inch from
that spot there, about half of an inch from that, didn't
he?
'' Q.

"A.

And next to the third molar tooth.

If that extends back there, as one of your witnesses said, some half to o/gths of an inch, that would be
right above the tonsil fossa, wouldn't it?
Q.

''A. Above it.
'' Q.

Laterally?

"A.

No, above it, above the tonsil.

"Q. If that is half of an inch from the mouth of
the tonsil fossa, and that fossa extended back there
from half to o/8 ths that would be right above it, wouldn't
it~

''A. The tonsil fossa very seldom extends past the
anterior pillar there, that is within half of an inch distant frorn your ulcerated spot there.
Yes, and had she pursued your advice of going
to have her teeth cleaned, and some more bridge work
'' Q.
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done, she would still have been an afflicted woman,
wouldn't she, Doctor~
''A. I didn't ask her to have the teeth cleaned,
there were no teeth to be cleaned.
cleaned~

'' Q.

Or gums

''A.

Take any infected area around the gums.

'' Q. You said infection area, the whole rear of
her mouth.
''A.

I never said it was the whole rear of her mouth.

''Q. Haven't you,

Doctor~

"A. It only involved the tonsils, around the third
molar tooth" (R. 473).
At his request (R. 475) ~Irs. Fredrickson went to
Dr.· Kerby for an x-ray. She submitted herself to that
x-ray for his own satisfaction and Dr. Kerby took what
he was asked to take by Dr. Maw for the purpose of
showing source of the bone spicules and to find if there
wli:s infection there. There was no bony involvement at
that time.
(That was In January 1949.)
ALICE EMERY
Formerly named Armour (R. 481), registered nurse
at the Clinic, assigned to Dr. l\£a\\'. Dr. Maw used a
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sponge to tap the blood as it comes from that area;
it was a light piere of g·auze (R. 487).

··Q.
Dr.

~la-w

Free and unattached from the hemostat, did
ever use a sponge in the mouth, or tonsil area'?

"A. I don't knou· that he did. No, he usually connects them zcitll the hemostat and taps, and doesn't
leave them in."
She has seen many throats after an operation.
The tonsil fossa after the tonsillectomy is a dark red
area, in a sac, just before you see the pillars; you look
into the throat and there would be two deep red areas
on. either side (R. 488).

DR. DOLOWITZ
He thought it unlikely that gauze and threads left
in the tonsil fossa could have migrated that far (to the
places where they were exuded).
As a matter of fact in reading the history of cases,
practically anything is p~ossible (R. 500). There are
migratory bodies and numerous instances of the most
fantastic things. Wierd things happen but usually the
migration is downward. His experience is very limited
with this; those he has seen have always been downward. It is possible for them to go laterally.
He removed threads between the 28th of June 1948
and the 16th day of November, 1948. Long after May
and June these ulcers were occurring and recurring (R.
29
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502). That has gone on constantly. This ulcerated con-

dition continued to the date he last saw her on 8 eptember 15, 1949. He never inserted any gauze within the
mouth or body of Mrs.. Fredrickson nor did he see anyone else do it.
"Q. (By Mr. Thurman) Now July 1, 1948 you said
there was some gauze or threads seen in one of the
ulcers, where was that~
''A. In the same ulcer, ts apvarently working up
from beneath.
Mr. Rich: Working up from

what~

''A. Working up from the bottom of the ulcer.
"Q. 'Working up?

''A. You have a hole- I would like to draw a diagram.

'' Q. Now, in case of an ulcer or abscess if some foreign material were in the bottom of that, what would
nature do to expell that thread~

''A. It would expell it.
"Q.

And that is when the ulcer works upward?

"A.

Yes, sir.

"Q.

In expelling the thread.
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''A. \Vhen we say upward it is upward from the
ulcer, but it would be lateral.'' Not vertically upward.

On November 8th a large mass of mate1·ial sluffed
out of the right side of the throat in the region marked
by a 4.
He found some threads on January 11, 1949 in the
first ulcers 1 and 2 ( R. 506).

During Mrs. Fredrickson's visits to him she may
have stated that she removed threads from the tonsil
area but he doubts it because there is nothing in his
notes (R. 507).
(He was asked to read his note from Nov. 15, 1948,
which he did as follows :)

" 'Patient comes in reporting that on the 8th of November a large mass of material sluffed out of the right
side of the throat at the pole of the tonsil slightly backward,' that is my way of putting it, slightly behind the
pole area, 'and upward toward the upper teeth. A large
pocket was formed and she reported to Dr. Argyle. She
brings in some material which she recovered from her
stool believing it to be the material she swallowed. I
am unable to tell her what it is composed of, and suggested if she really wishes to know to contact a laboratory. The hole is almost healed though there is still
some infection. At the site of the granulation that I
removed on the first there is one thread that I removed.
No other foreign body seen. There was some pus sur-
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rounding this. She insists there is still further foreign
body deeper in. To continue hot packs and icthyol packs.
Advise against probing for further material at thls
time.'''
That is the abscess from which he made the second
biopsy.
If he hadn't cut that deep biopsy the gauze wouldn't
have been able to work out (R. 515).

DR. SNOW
The normal tonsil in. an adult is over one inch, one
half inch thick by 5/8 of an inch wide ( R. 423). Thick
is depth. It becomes enlarged with disease.
The cavity, after the tonsil is removed is called the
fossa ( R. 425). It is exactly the size of the tonsil. It is
of varying depths, occasionally very shallow and the
tonsil protrudes; sometimes the tonsils look small and
upon taking them out we discover they are very deep,
from half to three quarters of an inch deep.
After the tonsil is removed the area between the
pillars fills with scar tissue (R. 429) and is skinned over
with mucous membrane, the lining of the throat. When
the tonsil is removed scar tissue commences to form (R.
430).
It is not the practice in this locality to sew the 'Pillars together (R. 433). If it were sewed in the gauze
would stay five or six days (R. 434). At the end of that
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time the sutures or the stitches would sluff away. 'Tlw
gauze would then be expelled (R. 435).
There are various methods of taking care of excessive bleeding (R. 439).
He has heard of the method of controlling bleedin.r;
by pu.tting a packing in the tonsil and suturing it. It is
described in the l iteratwre. He has never seen it done.
It is described and damned (R. 440).
He did not consider it good practice
to do that.

~n

this area

It would not be a good practice in this area to leave
a piece of sponge dressing, gauze in the throat.
If a tonsillectomy is properly performed food or
any other foreign S'ltbstance should not accumulate tn
the tonsil fossa; or in the area circled (on Exhibit 1).
If a piece of gauze were to become imbedded in the
tonsil area and then covered over by scar tissue it could
develop a foreign body reaction and the sponge would be
expelled by an abscess (R. 441). Eventually it would be
expelled. It would accumulate pus. Pus is the result
of breaking dott'n of the tissue. Infection would cause
bone to disintegrate (R. 442). Bacteria from the diseased area~ Infection means the presence of bacteria.
If the infection extends to the bony area it could cause
disintegration of the bony area.
In order to bury a .p~ece of gauze in the tonsil fossa
you would have to make an incision through the muscle
and bury it deep in that muscle (R. 444).
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If gauze ·came out of the area marked 1 and 2 on
Exhibit 1, on the anterior surface of the pillar, outside
the pillar, presumably that gauze had been in there
thirty days previously (R. 451). Gauze a quarter of an
inch thick, half an inch long, would certainly form an
abscess within a few weeks, certainly within a month
would be the length of time. It might have remained a
little longer than thirty days-not sixty days (R. 452).

"Q. So if a piece of gauze came out of that area
marked 1 and 2 on Exhibit '' 1 '' it was placed there
within sixty days ~
''A.

Surely.''

Exhibit F was handed to the witness and he was
asked if that was a small piece.
''A.

No, those are large pieces of thread.

'' Q.

Those are large pieces of thread.

''A.

It is a large mass of thread.

"Q. It is a large mass of thread, no question about
that at all, is there doctor~
"A.

No."

According to his op1nwn, to his professional opinion, if those came out of an individual's body at the
place indicated with a 4 on Exhibit 1 that had to have
been placed in that body within thirty or sixty days of
that time.
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''A.

Correct.''

"Q.

No question about that¥

"A.

No.''

His proessional opm1on was (R. 453) that masses
of thread that size placed in those areas in the muscle
would be shown evidently as exuding from the body
within thirty to sixty days.
'' Q. And then conversely it had to be placed 1n
there within that time~

"A.

Yes."

DR. CLEARY:

In his opinion a foreign body that manifests itself
on the 28th day of June, 1948 had to have been placed
in there within a few days before that date.
The balance of the evidence of defendant and his
witnesses was in conflict with the evidence of plaintiff
and the conflict was resolved by the jury in favor of
plaintiff.
Therefore, in considering the motion for directed
verdict, the foregowing admissions were before the trial
court in addition to the evidence of plaintiff and her
witnesses.
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ARGUMENT
Points 1 and 2
Counsel argues these points together. They are, of
course, different. At the close of plaintiff's case the
following basic facts were established: That prior to
Dr. Maw's operation she had never had any operation
in her throat where gauze or sponges were used; that
after the operation no doctor or dentist had done any
work in her throat or mouth where gauze or sponges
were used; that not doctor or dentist other than Dr.
Maw had ever performed any surgery in her throat;
that Dr. l\1:aw made an incision in her throat and used
gauze sponges in connection therewith; that the operation took about an hour; that immediately following
the operation she felt like there was a lump in her throat;
that this lum·p continued to exist until the gauze came
out; that immediatly following the operation and practically to the date of trial her throat, including the tonsH
area and right in the hole of the tonsil became ulcerated,
abscessed, diseased and infected; and that there was
finally exuded from her throat, immediately near ead1
tonsil, two pieces of gauze sponge - one on either side
- which were the source and cause of her physical and
mental suffering and damage; that thereafter her health
improved; that in the meantime she had been unable to
ascertain the cause of her trouble, although she had
told defendant, his nurse, Dr. Muirhead and her family
about the lump in her throat following the operation.
All other possible sources of the malpractice, excepting
Dr. Maw, were excluded by the evidence.
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At the conclusion of the rase there was to be considered by the trial court Dr. ~law'~ denial plus the
opinion of fellow members of his profession, that it
couldn't occur. rrhis created a conflirt in the evidence,
and the jury saw fit to belieYe the circumstantial evidene of plaintiff and to disbelieve the evidence of defendants.
In addition there were certain admissions and additional evidence gained from defendant's witnesses which
strengthened plaintiff's case.
Counsel quotes at length from the evidence of his
witnesses, ignoring the fact that such evidence did no
more than create a conflict and is not to be considered
as against the verdict of the jury and the ruling of the
trial court.
Dr. :Jiaw stands before this court the same as any
other individual who, operating alone without witnesses,
was the only one who actually knew what occurred but
whose word is in conflict with the proven facts from
which inferences may be drawn at variance with his
evidence.
EJrpert witnesses need not be believed if their opinions are not believable in the light of the evidence.
Mrs. Fredrickson had a tonsillectomy to aid her
arthritis. Dr. Maw performed the operation. He made
an incision on each side of her throat; used several gauze
sponges and catgut sutures to stop the bleeding. Whether he had to go beyond the tonsil area because they
37
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were imbedded and then forgot that he had done so, or
whether he packed the area and sutured it in, intending
later to remove it, or whether some other incident arose
which caused him to leave these two pieces of gauze
spong there - one on either side- is known only by Dr.
Maw. He denied that he did it. He admitted, however,
that he did not follow his usual practice in this case.
Usually he has his patients return the following day for
a checkup. In this ease he did not do so. Dr. Maw did
not see her again until over a month after the operation.
In the meantime scar tissue covered the tonsil cavity.
Immediately she felt a lump in her throat. She told him
and his nurse about it. He thought it was sinus and kept
on treating her for that and she kept going back. Her
throat was sore, ulcers broke out, she told him it felt like
a lump in her throat. For a year and a half he treated
her for sinus, getting no results.
She had never had sinus trouble. She had never had
any prior surgery in her throat. The only man who ever
worked there was Dr. J\Iaw.
Her whole mouth became sore, inflamed and ulcerated. In her desperation she finally thought she might
have bad teeth and that they were causing the infection
in her mouth. She had eighteen front teeth. She had
them out. When that failed to cure the trouble she
went back to Dr. Maw. He gave her ·penicillin. She went
to Dr. Boucher, her family physician. He gave her sulfa
and penicillin. She went to his successors, Dr. Johnson
and Dr. Boggess. They gave her penicillin. She went
to Dr. Muirhead (Moorehead) referred there by Dr.
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Boucher, told him she had a lun1p in her throat, following·
a tonsillecton1y, and had had a sore throat and rrwuth
ever since. He could see nothing and referred her back
to Dr. Boucher for more penicillin. For three years this
continued.
In the meantime, in her terror at being unable to get
cured of this throat condition, she continued to consult
Dr. :Maw. On one of those occasions he suggested the
possibility of cancer. He said it didn't look good. They
took a biopsy. She then consulted cancer experts. Dr.
:Maw was the first one to put the thought in her mindand there it rernained until Dr. Dolowitz uncovered the
two gauze sponges imbedded in her throat.
In _l\lay 1948, nearly three years after the operation,
she was sent to Dr. Dolowitz by Drs. Browning and Sears~
who still suspected cancer. He took several biopsies, one
of them deep, which released the gauze, and out came a
quantity of gauze and thread, on each side, right near the
place of the operation performed by Dr. Maw.
Who, other than Dr. l\Ia\Y, had ever performed surgery in her throat~ No one. She said so. Dr. Maw said
so.
This made a case for the jury.
The fact that plaintiff's case rest upon circumstantial evidence in the face of defendant 't denial does not
defeat her case. The fact that no eye-witness other than
the ·defendant, either alone or corroborated by othen;,
testifies to what he claims did not occur has never yet
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saved a defendant from the convicting effect of circumstantial evidence if believed by the jury to be more convincing as to its truthfulness. Plaintiff made a case for
the jury under the following authorities:
Carruthers v. Phillips, 169 Ore. 636, 131 Pac. 2d 193.
Plaintiff had an operation for prolapsed uterus.
Nearly two years later a gauze spong was discovered
in her bladder. Defendant testified that he never cut the
bladder, inserted no gauze into her bladder, and never at
any time put gauze in her body, hence couldn't have left
any. The operation for removal of the gauze sponge was
by another surgeon. Plaintiff testified that she never
had any operation prior to the repair of her uterus by
defendant and that she never at any time put any guaze
into her body.- Plaintiff's evidence further showed that
the bladder was exposed, a new bladder wall built up,
cutting was done, gauze sponges were used by defendant,
and a gauze sponge was removed twenty-one months
later. The Supreme Court of Oregon held this sufficient
to present a jury question.

"* * * Plaintiff was entitled to show that the
defendant had opportunity to do the act charged.
This she did show. She was entitled to go further and show that the defendant was the only
one who could have done the act charged. This,
too, she supported by her testimony. If the jury
believed the evidence which she introduced, it was
entitled to find that the defendant had inserted
the gauze in her bladder and permitted it to remain there. When the doing of an act by the defendant is charged, evidence is admissible to show
that the defendant had opportunity to do it, even
40
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though his opportunity be not shown to be exclusive, buts ·Since the sho-wing of opportunity
leaves open all the hypotheses of other person's
eqttal opportunity, it l:s proper for the proponent
of the evidence to strellgthen it by cutting off, so
far as poss-ible these other hypotheses, i.e., by
showing that the person charged was one of a
few only, or the sole person, having the opportunity. In other words, 1rhile the proponent need
not, he may always show exclusive opportunity.'
1 \Yigmore on Evidence, 2nd Ed., sec. 131. In
the case at bar the evidence for the plaintiff, if
believed, \Yas sufficient to warra~t the jury in
finding that gauze was placed and remained in
plaintiff's bladder and that the defendant had
opportunity and was the only one who did have
opportunity to place it there and therefore that
the defendant did the act charged. See Moore v.
Ivey, Tex .. Civ. A:pp., 264 S.W. 283.

''Furthermore, there was ample evidence
concerning proximate causation and damage. If
gauze was inserted in the bladder and allowed
to remain there, it resulted in the condition described by Dr. Hunter, causing infection and
pain and requiring operative removal. The evidence of negligence is likewise substantial. No
question of liability for mistake of professional
judgment was involved. No one claimed that the
gauze should have been inserted in the bladder.
No one claimed that if so inserted its removal at
the time of the operation would involve any
exercise of professional judgment. Compare Rayburn v. Day, 1928, 126 Or. 135, at page 148, 268
P. 1002, 59 A.L.R. 1062. No one claimed that any
incision of the bladder wall should have been
made. The whole defense was that no incision
was made, no gauze inserted and none left in. * *
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"Upon presentation of evidence that a physician inserted gauze in and failed to remove it
from an incision, it has been frequently held that
he became guilty of negligence as a matter of
Jones, 1929, 152 Wash. 508,
law. McCormick
278 P. 181, 65 A.L.R. 1019; Moore v. Ivey, supra
(citing 21 R.C.L. 388); Ruth v. Johnson, 8 Cir.,
172 F. 191, Wynne v. Harvey, 1917, 96 Wash. 379,
165 P. 67.

v.

''Instances may perhaps arise in which such
a conclusion would be prop:er, but it cannot be
asserted as a general rule. In the case of Rayburn v. Day, supra, where the ·proprierty of inserting the gauze in the operative field was unquestioned, the evidence disclosed an emergency
situation in which the propriety of removing or
not removing the gauze became one of professional judgment. In such a case it could not be
said that the closing of an incision without removing the sponge was negligence as a matter
of law. But even in Rayburn v. Day, the question
was one for the jury. The standard of skill and
care which the law imposes upon the surgeon in
the performance of an operation is not limited
in its application to the use of the knife. He
must also use skill in the removal of surgical
sponges. Rayburn v. Day, supra; 41 Am. J ur.,
p. 213, sec. 97. While the failure to remove
sponges may not in all instances constitute a
breach of the surgeon's duty to use the req:uired
care and skill, still it is generally held to require
the submission of the question of negligence to
the jury. It is prima facie negligence for an
operating surgeon to leave a surgical S'ponge in
a wound after the incision is closed. 41 Am. Jur.,
p. 213, sec. 97.
* * * * *
"We are referred by the defendant to an
opinion by Judge Jaggard in Staloch v. Holm,
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100 l\linn. :276, 111 N.,V. 2li4, 266, 9 L.R.A., N.S.,
712, wherein a distinction is made between the
standard of care in ordinary negligence cases and
in actions for n1alpractice. In the former the
test is the conduct of the ordinary prudent man
under the circumstances, and 'that a man has
acted according to his best judgment is no defense', whereas in a malpractice actions, the fact
that the want of success was due to an error of
judgn1ent may sometimes be a defense. Assuming the distinction to have been accurately stated,
the answer is that in the case at bar there was
no question concerning the exercise of professional judgn1ent, mistaken or otherwise, so far
as the placing or removal of a sponge was concerned. The defendant cannot now claim that he
made a mere error of judgment in failing to remove a sponge which he swears he never inserted.
It follows that if the instruction of the court
applied to this case the standard of care applicable to ordinary negligence cases, then the
instruction was unduly favorable to the defendant who was under obligation to exercise that
degree of skill, care, diligence and knowledge
which is ordinarily possessed by the average of
the members of his profession in good standing
in similar localities. * * *

In malpractice the circumstances are peculiar, and so the general rule is peculiarly adapted
to meet then1. Among the circumstances are the
Rkill and training of the physician, the inherent
difficulties of operative treatment, the impossibility of certainty in diagnosis and cure, and the
frequent necessity for the exercise of professional
judgment, together with the advanced condition
of the medical science on the community. Judge
Haggard, in the case cited supra, after explaining that a surgeon is not liable for a mere error
in judgment, makes the following distinction:
43
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' When the physician is actually operating he is
employing surgery as an art, and if, for example,
he * * * sew up a sponge in an abdomen has been
opened, * * * his wrong concerns physical facts,
and has fairly been held to be governed by ordinary principles of negligence.' "

Winchester v. Chabut, ______ Mich.------, 32 N.W. 2d 358.
Plaintiff sued for malpractice in leaving a gauze
~ponge in an incision after an open operation for reduction of comminuted fracture of the femur. Defendant
denied that a sponge was left and contended that the
abscesses were caused by bone spicules working out.
There was no direct evidence that a sponge had been
left. Plaintiff testified that pieces of cotton gauze
worked out and were discharged from the abscesses
after they had been lanced. Defendant in turn testified
that such pieces of gauze were some that he inserted in
the abscesses for drainage. Plaintiff denied this. A
motion for directed verdict was made; it was denied
and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. We quote
the following from the opinion of the Michigan Supreme
Court sustaining the verdict:
''Defendant contends that the court should
have directed a verdict for him because there was
neither direct nor medical nor scientific evidence
establishing or tending to establish the leaving
of a sponge in the wound and no evidence of malpractice. Lack of direct evidence of the alleged
act of negligence is not fatal to plaintiff's case
when there is evidence from which an inference
to that effect may legitimately be drawn. LeFaive
v. Asselin, 262 Mich. 443. Defendant insists that
the extrusion of several pieces of cotton gauze
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fron1 different abscesses is not evidence from
which it may be inferred that a gauze sponge vvas
left in the wound berause testimony of doctors
sworn for the defense was that the physical reaction and natural processes in extruding such
sponge, consisting of one piece of gauze about
15 inches square and folded and refolded into a
3 inch square, would be to encapaulate it and extrude it in one mass at one opening and that nature in this process does not unfold, separate and
twist it in strands and extrude them separately
in various places in the manner in which extrusion of gauze is alleged to have occurred in this
case. However, the testimony of one of defendant's expert witnesses was that it might conceivably be erupted through one or more abscesses. There was thtts a question of fact for the
jury and testimony from whi'ch an inference
might leg-itimately be drawn that the extrusion of
bits of gauze from the several abscesses was
occasioned by leaving a gauze sponge in the
wound at the time of the operation. That this did
not constitute good medical practice need not
have been (LeFaive v. Asselin, supra), but was,
shown by the testimony of expert witnesses. As
said in Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383,
even tlz e 1nerest tyro would know this was improper. A doctor sworn for the plaintiff testified
that, under the history of the case, after the
abscesses occurred good practice required more
than mere lancing, as was done by defendant in
this case, but rather, exploratory surgery to discover the cause of the abscesses. The question of
defendant's negligence or malpractice in this
connection was one for the jury.
"Defendant also contends that the verdict is
against the great weight of the evidence because
his experts testified that the presence of a
sponge in the wound after suturing would cause
45
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certain reactions which did not occur in this case;
but the doctor sworn for plaintiff testified that
the reactions could be such as plain tiff claims
did occur in this case. The doctors testifying for
defendant and plaintiff agreed that plaintiff had
not enjoyed the normal recovery to be expected
in the abscence of untoward occurrences at or
after the operation; that x-ray pictures show
malunion of the bone and that this could result
from infection caused by leaving a surgical
sponge in the wound. There is competent evidence to support plaintiff's theories in this case
and we cannot say that the verdict is against the
great weight of the evidence."
Aderhold v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 72, 46 Pac. 2d 340.
Plaintiff sued for malpractice in leaving a surgical
gauze sponge in her body following an appendectomy.
During the operation the surgeon (defendant) discovered that she had gallstones, made a second incision
and removed the gallstones, placed a drainage in the
lower (appendix) incision, removed the tube and gauze
used for drainage about two weeks later, and then permitted her to go home. Thereafter the upper incision
for gallstones healed but the lower one continued to
discharge pus and did not heal. She went back to defendant, vYho probed for foreign matter, found none
and sent her home where she consulted her local physician. She then returned to defendant, six months after
the original operation and he removed a piece of gauze.
She asked the doctor how that happened and he said,
''It was left in there.''
Defendant testified that he did not leave any sponge
in plaintiff's body; that he did not find any sponge on
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,; ....

the occasion of his examination when he probed for
foreign objects; that the sponge that he removed in
Decen1ber was not the kind of sponge that he used in
the operation; that he and the nurse counted the sponges
that were used and that there were none missing; that
none were left. The nurses testified to the same effect.

Plaintiff testified that neither she nor her husband
nor anyone else had placed any sponge or gauze in the
wound between the date of the operation and the date
of its removal.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma said this made a
case for the jury, and used the following language in
sustaining the verdict for plaintiff:
''In the case before us we have a direct conflict of testimony as to the basic fact in this
The defendant's testimony is to the effect that
he used about 41 sponges in the body of plaintiff during the operation; that he did not leave any
of these sponges in the plaintiff's body, but that
he did remove a sponge from her wound on December 30. The plaintiff's testimony was to the
effect tha"C no one else ever placed any sponge
in her body at any time. Under these circumstances two questions arise :
"(1) Did the defendant leave a sponge in
the body of plaintiff from June 19 to December
30~

'' ( 2)
his

If he did so, was this negligence on

part~

''We believe these are properly jury questions and that the trial court committed no error
in submitting these questions to the jury."
47
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Jackson v. Hansard, 45 Wyo. 201, 17 Pac. 2d 659:
Plaintiff claimed defendant left a large sponge in
his abdomen following an appendectmny. A sponge was
discharged through the rectum three months and ten
days following the operation.
Plaintiff testified that he commenced having severe
pains in his abdomen shortly after the operation; that
he complained to defendant of the condition; that he
w:as given medicine; that he went to other doctors and
hospitals, including Mayo Brothers and the Veterans
Hospital; that he got no relief until the sponge was
discharged.
Defendant testified that he did the operation; that
large and small sponges were used; that all sponges
were counted and checked and none were left in plaintiff's body; that hemostats were attached to all large
sponges used and that it was impossible for S'ponges to
became lost.
Plaintiff further testified that he never placed the
gauze in his rectum and did not swallow it.
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court
granted a motion for judgment for defendant notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff. In reversing this ruling
of the trial court, the following is said:
"In view of the conflict in the testimony, the
question as to the size and character of the gauze
or sponge removed from plaintiff, and as to
whether it was or was not the same kind of gauze
as used in the operation, was for the jury.
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•·Counsel for the defendant argue that it is
iinprobable, if not impossible, that a sponge or
gauze of the size claimed by the plaintiff to have
beE'n rernoYE'd from him should have penetrated
into and passed through the large intestines. Dr.
Geis stated that he did not think that during three
months and ten days a piece of gauze of the size
claimed by the plaintiff would ulcerate into the
intE'stinal tube; that if it had been left in the
abdon1en, peritonitis would have followed; that
plaintiff would haYE' died or would have been at
death 's door. Dr. Riach testified that if such
sponge had been left as claimed, general or local
peritonitis would have followed; that it it had
ulcerated into the intestines it would not have
been expelled through the rectum; that it could
in part have gained entrance to the intestinal
tract, but that it could not have traveled through
the large intestines, issuing out of the rectum.
Defendant's testimony was similar in effect.

* * *
''Considering the testimony as a whole, and
without attempting to state any further details,
we think that it was a question for the jury to
determine as to whether or not the sponge or gauze
was left in plaintiff's abdominal cavity as
claimed. \V e may summarize the reasons as follows: First, plaintiff testified that he did not
insert the gauze into his rectum. Second, the
testimony indicates that it is unlikely that the
plaintiff swallowed the gauze. Third, it is not
claimed that any other operation was performed
on the plaintiff after the operation in May, 1929,
and if accordingly it is true, as plaintiff testified, that he did not insert the gauze or sponge
as claimed, and if he did not swallow it, the only
opportunity for the sponge or gauze to get into
the plaintiff's body existed at the time of the
operation in May, 1929. Fourth, the plaintiff tes49
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tified that he had continued pains and gripings
near the place where the operation was performed
and the regions surrounding it, and his recovery
from the operation did not proceed in a normal
way. Fifth, Dr. Keith testified directly that in
his opinion, under the facts in this case, the
gauze or sponge in question was left in the plaintiff's body at the time of the operation in May,
1929. Under this evidence, if true, the conclusion
would, we think, be justified that the plaintiff's
claim in this case that the gauze in question was
left in his abdomen during the operation in May,
1929, was justified, and that conclusion would not
be based upon any presumptions but upon pure
matters of fact. It is of course true that it is
truly wondrous that a sponge of the size in question
tion can work its way through the large intestines in the manner claimed in the case at bar, and
yet this is not the first case in which a situation
similar to that has been presented to the courts,
as will be noted by examining the cases of Spears
v. McKinnon, 168 Ark. 357, 270 S. \V. 524; Moore
v. Ivey (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S. 1N. 283; Akridge
v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949, 41 S. E. 78. In Ruth v.
Johnson ( C.C.A.) 172 F. 191, it appears that a
sponge left in the abdominal cavity had worked
its way into the ascending colon some two and a
half to three inches. Counsel for the defendant
have sought to distinguish the first two of the
foregowing cases because the subjects of the operations in those cases were females. We are unable to see the distinction. In the Moore Case
the size of the gauze removed from the plaintiff
was about eight inches wide to thirty-two or
thirty-four inches in length.

* * * * * * *
"While we do not believe that it would be wise
in the interests of society to require too exacting
a care of a profession which is, has been, and will
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be, of untold benefit to humanity, still we cannot
lay down a rule that the jury must, necessarily,
accept the testimony of the operating surgeon and
the nurses and ignore the circumstances shown
in a case, for that would mean that recovery
would be practically made im·possible in every
case. And we think that under the evidence in
this case as outlined above, the question of due
care was not a question of law, but was one for
the jury to decide, subject, of course, to the ordinary right of the trial judge in such cases. We
have not deemed it necessary to decide whether
or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be
applied in a case of this character."
McCormick v Jones, 132 Wash. 508, 278 Pac. 181.
Plaintiff was a government employee at Puget
Sound Xavy Yard. He had an injury which resulted in
fracture of the fifth lumbar vertebrae. He was treated
at the government hospital and thereafter sent by the
U. S. Employee's Comp. Commission to defendant; in
the meantime he had gone to numerous other physicians
for relief. Defendant recommended a bone transplant
operation to immobilize the back. He made an incision,
removed the portions of the bone that had been fractured,
making a gutter in the spine and then made a bone graft.
During the course of the operation a sudden hemorrhage
developed and sponges were used. Through some inadvertance a sponge was left. Thereafter the sponge was
removed.
A verdict for defendant was reversed. In reversing
the case the following is said as to the law:
51
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''On the question of negligence we think little
need be said. We think all of the witnesses who
testified on the subject on both sides admitted
that the leaving of the S'ponge in the wound was
was negligence. We also think that the court can
say as a matter of law that when a surgeon inadvertently introduces into a wound a foreign substance, closes up the wound, leaving that foreign
substance in the body, there being no possibility
of any good purpose resulting therefrom, that act
constitutes negligence. A fair reading of the
testimony of all of the medical experts called on
this case leads to that conclusion.
"We do not believe that the minds of reasonable men differ on this subject, and that a mere
statement of the facts conclusively shows negligence, and that appellant, being the head surgeon
in charge of this operation, is responsible therefor. If the jury, therefore, found for respondent
on the ground of no negligence, the appellant is
entitled to a new trial."
In addition to the above cases we cite, without quoting from, the following cases which are in point in
principle:
Ybarra

Y.

Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d-486, 154 Pac. 2 687.

Reinhold v. Spencer, 53 Ida. 688, 26 Pac. 2d 796.
JYiorrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 Pac. 2d 590.
Daly

Y.

Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 288 Pac. 633.

Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 Pac. 2d 409.
In the last above named case the California Supreme
Court used some very pertinent language:
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'' • "' * 'Ye have already held upon authority that
the failure to remove a sponge from the abdomen
of a patient is negligence of the ordinary type and
that it does not involve knowledge of materia
medica or surgery but that it belongs to that class
of mental lapses 'vhich frequently occur in the
usual routine of business and commerce, and in
the multitude of commonplace affairs which come
"ithin the group of ordinary actionable negligence. The layman needs no scientific enlightenment to see at once that the omission can be
accounted for on no other theory than that some
one has committed actionable negligence.''
These decisions do not differ materially from principles recognized by this court as applicable in sponge
cases but not applied in the decided cases where no such
facts were involved.
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 Pac. 2d 257.
Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 Pac. 2d 712.
Counsel states, however, that the two motions should
have been granted because the evidence in the case brings
us within principles announced in Tremelling v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co. and two other cases cited.
Counsel states that this court has held in those cases
that when a wrong or injury has been brought about
from one or the other of two occurrences, either one of
which may have been the sole proximate cause, and the
defendant in the case is or could be responsible for one
only, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence, before he is entitled to have the case submitted
53

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to a jury, that the defendant's wrong was the sole proximate cause. He cites, as authority for that broad statement Tremelling v. Southern Pacific, 51 Utah 189; 170
Pac. 80 and Edd v. U. P. Coal Co., 25 Utah 293, 71 Pac.
215; and Reid v. S.P.L.A. & S.L. R.R., 39 Utah 617, 118
Pac. 1029.
Those cases are not authority for any such proposition.
If we understand counsels statement corectly it is
that a defendant, by showing another possible cause of
the injury or wrong, thereby takes the case from the
jury and make's it mandatory on the trial court to grant
a non-suit or direct a verdict.
Or perhaps he means that it then becomes incumbent
on the trial judge to determine where the preponderance
of the evidence lies and submit the case to the jury only
in the event the judge believes that the evidence preponderates in favor of plaintiff.
On the other hand he might mean that it is the duty
of this court to say where the preponderance of the
evidence is.
In every case the plaintiff' must ·prove his case by
a preponderance of the evidence. It is for the jury to
decide whether he has done so.
In the Tremelling case there was no evidence as to
how the deceased met his death. Nor was there any
evidence from which inferences might be drawn as to the
54
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cau~e of the injury. The only evidence was that .the
deceased was found near the track, dead. The theory of
plaintiff \Yas that deceased struck a freight car on the
~idetrack but there were no 1narks on the car showing
such to be the fact. In the absence of such evidence it
wa~ just as probable that the deceased fell and hit the
ground as it was that he hit the freight car.

One would assume fron1 the case that if there had
been evidence of marks on the freight car there would
then have been a case for jury determination because it
could then haYe been inferred that he hit the car. Such
an inference from factual evidence is what is known as
circumstantial evidence.
\Vhere facts are established by competent evidence
from which inferences may be drawn that defendant committed the wrong or caused the injury, the case goes to
the jury even through there may be direct evidence to the
contrary. Courts and text writers have uniformly held
that circumstantial evidence may be, and often is, more
convincing in establishing the truth than direct evidence.
It simply presents a conflict in the evidence for the
trier of the fcts to determine.

The holding of the Tremelling case is not fairly set
forth in counsel's quotation. The whole opinion is based
upon the following statement:
'' If there had been no frost on the standing car,
which of necessity must have been disturbed in
case any person, object, or thing came in contact
therewith, there would be at least some basis for
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the inference contended for by plaintiff. Where,
however, as in this case, the inference is based
upon an assumed or supposed fact, which fact the
evidence shows did not exist, then the inference
is left without support. * * * It must not be
assumed, however, that the rule thus stated can
be given general application. Indeed, the rule
can rarely be applied, since the evidence generally
is such that it is the exclusive province of the jury
to draw the inference therefrom. The case at bar,
however, presents a typical case where the rule is
applicable. Here the plaintiff relies entirely upon
an assumed fact, namely, that the deceased came
in contact with the freight car which was standing
on the side track. The witnesses produced both
by the plaintiff and the defendant, however, all
agree that the car standing on the side track was
covered all over with a thick coating of frost;
that any person, object, or substance touching the
car at any point or place interfered with the coating of frost and disturbed it so that is was easily
seen by any one that some one or something had
come in contact with the car; that after careful
examination, lasting a considerable length of time,
no mark of any kind was discovered indicating
that any one or anything had come in contact with
the car at any point, and that experiments were
made to determine whether, if any one or anything of substance had touched the frosting on
the car, evidence of the fact would appear in the
frosting. The assumed fact that the body of the
deceased came in contact with the car was thus
clearly, if not conclusively, negatived.''
The Tremelling case was considered and its applicability discussed in the case of Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad v. Ind. Comm., 66 Utah 494, 243 Pac.
800. Mr. Justice Frick, who wrote the Tremelling deci56
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sion, was still a Inember of this eourt and eoneurred in
this later deeision. The facts are interesting. The employee testified that he hit himself on the knee with a
hammer; that there was a bruise, pain, diseloration and
swelling. The doetor diagnosed it as rheumatism. Two
weeks later he was sent to the hospital where an abseess
developed. Fron1 this the hip beeame infeeted. He then
became totally disabled. It also developed in the evidenee
that two or three months prior to the injury he had some
boils 'Yhich had entirely healed up and disappeared.
Cpon this proposition there was a eonfliet in the
opinion of the doetors as to whether the aecident caused
the infection in the hip or whether the infection in the
hip came from the boils.
The Industrial Commission, trier of the faets, found
the issues in favor of the employee. On appeal it was
argued that the case came within the principle announeed
in the Tremelling case. This court said that it did not
and that there was substantial evidence to support the
decision of the trier of the facts and that the finding
could not disturbed on appeal. Here is what this court
said, in that case, "'ith reference to the applieability of
the Tremelling case to that faetual situation.
'' The reasons why the rule invoked can have no
appliation to the case at bar are elearly set forth
in James v. Robertson, 117 P. 1068, 1072, 39 Utah
414, at page 438, where Frick, C. J., speaking for
the court, said :
'' 'That doctrine applies only where the plaintiff's evidence, when considered alone, has such
an effect, or when the jury finds the evidence
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equally balanced, and not, as apvpellant's counsel
seems to contend, when all of the evidence produced by both sides, some of which is in dispute,
is capable of such a construction. The reason the
rule is not applicable in the latter event is obvious.
There is no law which binds a jury to believe any
of the defendant's evidence which conflict with
that of the plaintiff. The doctrine, therefore,
ordinarily cannot apply in cases of conflicting
evidence.'

"Again, at page 429 (117 P. 1073):
" 'The law is not that a plaintiff must fail in
case the injury of which he complains might have
been caused- that is, that there was a possibility
that it was caused- by some cause or causes for
which the defendant was not responsible, but he
must fail only when it is just as probable from the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff, or in case the
evidence is equally balanced, that the inj11;ry was
produced by some cause for which the defendant
was not responsible, as it is that it was produced
by a cause for which he was.'
''The evidence in behalf of the employee in
the case at bar was not open to two inferences of
equal probability as to the cause of his disability.
The evidence of the fact of injury, following by
the abscess in the knee, which in turn was followed by the infection, by the same kind of bacteria, of the hip joint, together with expert opinion evidence that the latter resulted from tht>
former, is substantial evidence and a 'satisfactory
foundation' for the finding that the injury was
the cause of the disability. See Murray City v.
Ind. Com., 183 P. 331, 55 Utah 44; Bingham
Mines Co. v. Allsop, 203 P. 644, 59 Utah 306;
Milford Copper Co. v. Ind. Com., 210 P. 993, 61
Utah 37."
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Again, in 'V ard v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, 96 Utah 564, 85 Pac. 2nd 837, this
court states:
'' Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Co., 51 Utah
189, 200, 170 Pac. 80, \Yas a case not where there
were equal inferences as is sometimes mistakenly
said, but there was no basis for any inferences.
If there is a basis for two or more inferences the
ju,ry must decide which is the correct one. The
evidence in this case presents a basis for finding
negligence and a basis from which it may be inferred that the negligence caused death.''
Recently the problem of two conflicting inferences
was discussed in Southern Pacific Company v. Industrial
Commission, 96 Utah 510, 87 Pac. 2d 811 :
''On the other hand, the commission might
have found that death was due to natural causes.
But where there is evidence from which two conflicting inferences might reasonably be drawn,
this court should not reverse a decision of the
commission which adopts what appears to be the
more probable of the two. Columbia Steel Co. VIndustrial Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P. 2d 124.
vVhere there is no basis for an inference as to
how death was caused or, put as it has been put,
but rather inaccurately, that where there are in
law equal inferences, as in the case of Tremelling
v. Southern Pacific Company, 51 Utah 189, 170
P. 80, affirmed in 70 Utah 72, 257 P. 1066, the
jury 0annot be permitted to supply the link between the fact of a dead body found in a certain
position and the cause of the death by a guess as
to how it occurred. But where there is a basis for
some reasonable inferences as to how the death
was caused, and it cannot be said in law that a
reasonable man could not choose one deduction
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from the underlying facts as against another, the
finding of the jury will be upheld."

See also Lym v. Thompson, 112 Utah 24, 184 Pac.
2d 667. The question was as to who stole the steel
tubing. Defendant admitted purchasing 38. rrhere was
direct evidence, in conflict with that evidence, that he
took 63. There were originally 119 tubes and all of
them disappeared about that time. Defendant established that there were holes in the fence and that others
could get in. Who did it~ The trial court said defendant did, notwithstanding the inference that others might
have had access to the yard where it was stored. This
was based entirely on circumstantial evidence in the
face of the conflicting inference created by defendant's
evidence. Here is what this court said with reference
to the finding of the trial court :
''The well reasoned case of New York Life
Ins Co. v .l\IcN eely, 52 Ariz. 181, 79 P.ac. 2d 948,
sets down the rule governing the use of circumstantial evidence in civil cases which we deem
sound and will apply to the evidence here. 52
Ariz. 181, 79 Pac. 2d at page 954.
'' 'In civil cases, involving only property
rights * * ,z, it is sufficient, if the ultimate fact is
to be determined by an inference from facts
which are established by direct evidence, that it
be more probable than any other inference which
could be drawn from the facts thus proven.' * * *
But, the lower oourt htls seen fit to reject de·fendant's version of the case and the question
for us to decide is not which of the two sides
should be believed. We are called upon to decide whether or not there is evidence in the case
that will directly or by inference support the
60
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dec1"siou of the trier of the facts. In deciding that
question 1ce decide merely-so far as circumstantial evidence is concerned-that if there are inferences to be drmcn therefrom that will ,-..·uppm·t
the lower court's conclusions upon the probabilities of that e·vidence, we are bou.nd to uphold
the decision, even though had we been trying
the case we might l~ave stressed the inferences
adt·e rsely to such a conclusion. We have shown
above how there are inferences that will support the lower court's conclusion and therefore
we must affirm it. It is so ordered."

This court also considered the Tremelling opinion
in a malpractice case, viz. Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah
59, :27:2 Pac. :229. The plaintiff claimed that her fingers were pinched while she was on the operating table,
under defendant's control. She showed that her fingers were uninjured when she went under the anesthetic. About 45 minutes after coming out of the anesthetic in her hospital room she found that her hand
"·as injured. Her fingers had been pinched and crushed.
Defendant contended that they could have been
crushed in the hospital bed and produced evidence that
it was more probable that it could occur in the hospital
bed than the operating table. In fact he had the operating table in the court room, before the jury, and tried
to demonstrate that a person's fingers simply could not
get caught in the operating table.
But the jury didn't believe that evidence.
Plaintiff rested her case entirely on circumstanHal evidence, as she had to do, as against the positive
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denial of defendant and the purported inference that
she might have gotten her finger caught in the hospital
\bed.
There, as here, defendant said the trial court should
fu.ave directed a verdict on the basis of the Tremelling
case and the Reid case, both cited by defendant as authority here. This court refused to reverse the ruling
of the trial court in submitting the case to the jury and
sustained the verdict. in these words :
"Upon this evidence it is the contention that
the plaintiff failed to prove that her fingers were
injured on or about the operating table or while
she was being opera ted on and as in her complaint alleged; that on the evidence it is mere
conjecture or speculation that her fingers were
injured in such manner; that on the evidence it
is just as probable that the injury occurred
through manipulations or adjustments of the bed
after the plaintiff was removed from the operating room as through manipulations or adjustments of the operating table, and that in such
situation of equal probabilities, or equal probable
causes, one for which the defendant might be
responsible and the other not, the case ought to
have been withheld from the jury. * * *
''On the evidence adduced on behalf of the
plaintiff herself, it is not reasonably inferable
that her injury resulted through manipulations
or adjustments of the bed. Whatever inference
in such particular, if any, may be deduced, comes
from the defendant's evidence. The plaintiff, of
course, was required to adduce sufficient evidence
to justify a finding that her fingers were injured
through manipulations or adjustments of the operating table and as in her complaint alleged.
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It is not claimed that she was required to prove
that by direct or positiYe evidence or by the testimony of some on who actually saw the fingers
pinched or hurt in ~ueh manner. lt is enough if
facts and circun1stances are proven which reasonably point to the inference that her fingers
were injured in such n1anner and which are consistent therewtih and not equally consistent with
an inference that they were injured in some other
n1anner. * * *

-•.;
__

....

n:·-

"It is urged the case is within the rule announced in the cases of Tremelling v. S. P. Co.,
51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80; Reid v. S. P. L. A. &
S. L. R. Co., 39 Utah 617, 118 P. 1009, and other
cases, where it in effect is stated that the plaintiff to sustain his cause must prove more than
a mere conjecture or probability that the injury
occurred as alleged by him; and that where the
plaintiff seeks to prove an allegation essential
to his cause only by an inference or inferences
sought to be deduced from proven facts and circumstances, and the evidence so adduced by him
with equal force points to several inferences or
causes, one of which rendering the defendant liable and the other or others not, the plaintiff has
not sustained his cause by sufficient evidence.
Such is but familiar doctrine and upon which the
rule of indirect or cimcumstantial evidence is
founded. But it here has no application, for on
the theory of. plaintiff's cause and upon the evidence adduced by her, though indirect or circumstantial in character, whatever inference or
inferences may be deduced therefrom point in
but one direction and are consistent only with
the inference or inferences that plaintiff's fingers were injured at or about the operating table.
Whatever inference or inferences, if any, may be
deduced that the injury occurred in some other
way or by manipulations or adjustments of the
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bed, are to be deduced from facts and circumstances shown by the defendant and not by the
plaintiff. The defendant did not by any direct
or positive evidence show that plaintiff's fingers were injured by manipulations or adjustments of the bed. He but sought such an inference to be deduced from facts and circumstances
proven by him and from manipulations of the bed
before the jury. Of course, throughout the case,
the plaintiff had the burden of proving by a fair
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence
that the injury occurred as alleged by her.
Whether on all of the evidence she sustained that
burden was on the record a question for the jury.
It is not within our province to determine whether
the injury occurred in the one way or the other,
or whether it is even more probable that it occurred the one way rather than the other. We
may only determine whether there is sufficient
evidence, if believed by the jury, to justify or
warrant a finding that the injury occurred as
alleged by the plaintiff. We think the case, on
the evidence, does not come within the rule contended for by the defendant. James v. Robertson,
39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068. We are therefore of
the opinion that the motion for a directed verdict was properly over-ruled.''
Counsel also refers to the case of Reid v. S. P. L.A.
& S. L. R. R. Co., 39 Utah 617, 118 Pac. 1009. A cow
got onto the right of way and was killed. There was
an open gate, for the opening and closing of which defendant was not responsible, near the dead cow. About
a mile away was a break in the fence for the maintenance of which the railroad was responsible. There the
evidence rested and this court very properly held that
the jury could not speculate as to whether the cow went
64
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through the gate, which was more probable, or through
the fence, which was remote. What would have been the
situation if the eow had been found near the broken
fence and in addition the plaintiff had established some
recent droppings of the cow at or near the broken fence,
·with additional evidence that no other cow had been
there to leaYe tlwse droppings? \Y ould the court then
haYe said that there was no evidence from which the
jury could have concluded that the cow went through
the broken fencef
Under our Constitution guaranteeing to citizens the
right to a trial by jury and placing the burden of finding the facts upon a jury, courts have been very loathe
to encroach upon the province of the jury.
Where there is any substantial evidence to go to
the jury it must be submitted. And this is true where
the evidence is conflicting and where several inferences
may be drawn from the evidence. The general principles are set forth in 53 Am. Juris. 147, sec. 164, under
''Trial,'' as follows:

I.L:
1:1

''Sufficiency of Evidence.-While as a general
rule a party is not entitled to the submission of
the case to the jury unless the evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding in his favor, where
there is evidence of so positive and significant a
character as would support a verdict, if uncontradicted, it is the duty of the trial court to submit the case to the jury. It is the province of the
jury to determine the weight and sufficiency of
the evidence when the evidence is conflicting;
even though it is not conflicting, the court may
not take the case from the jury when different
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inferences may be drawn therefrom and when
there is evidence which will support ·a verdict.
Some cases hold, moreover, that it is not necessa:r:·y, in order to entitle the plaintiff to go to the
jury, that his evidence be such as to warrant a
verdict, but only that the evidence be sufficient
to present to the jury a question of fact.''

See also Sec. 158 of the same text :
"Questions of Fact.-In a case being tried by
a jury the court should not undertake to pass on
and decide issues of fact. The jury's function has
as definite sanction as that of the court. The
controlling functions of a jury are to pronounce
on the credibility of witnesses; to determine disputed facts; to draw conclusions from doubtful
and contradictory premises; and to admeasure
damages where the law has afforded no standard.
It is the province of the jury to hear the evidence
and by their verdict to settle the issues of fact,
no matter what the state of the evidence. Where
different conclusions may reasonably be drawn
by different minds from the same evidence, the
question is ordinarily one for the jury. This is
true not only where the uncertainty is caused by
a substantial conflict in the testimony, but also
where the facts are undisputed but are such that
different conclusions may reasonably be drawn
from them. But it is only where different minds
may draw different conclusions from evidence of
a fact in issue that a question for the jury is presented. The issue presented by the invoeation of
the rule against creation of unfair prejudice in
favor of one person to an action, by the introduction of evidence, is one of fact.''
There is practically no conflict in the authorities on
this proposition. The cases are annotated in the Digest
66
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Sy~tem

under subdivision 142 .. Trials" so far as they
relate to inferences to be drawn from the evidence as
affecting- the right of the court to grant a motion for
non-suit or directed verdict.
Utah has several cases on this subject. It would
unduly lengthen this brief to give them all. We cite
only a few of the many.
Anderson v.

~ ixon,

104 Utah 262; 139 Pac. 2d 216:

"':Jledicine not being an exact science, it is
not necessary that the proximate cause of an injury sustained through the negligence of a doctor
be proved with exactitude. It is enough if there
is substantial evidence to support the judgment.
Reynolds v. Struble, 128 Cal. App. 716, 18 P. 2d
690. If the injury sustained could be attributed
to two or more causes, one of which was the negligence of the doctor, it would be a question for
the jury to determine which was the proximate
cause of the injury."
Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 100 Utah 120,
110 Pac. (2d) 566:
''At the outset we may remark that it is well
settled in this state that we are bound by the
findings of fact of the trial court, if there is any
substantial evidence to maintain them (Brittain
v. Gorman, 42 Utah 586, 133 P. 370), and that
where a finding is based upon sufficient evidence
we will not reverse it, even if we are inclined
to arrive at a different conclusion than the trial
judge. Fee v. National Bank, 37 Utah 28, 106
P. 517.

* *

"It is of course true that where opinion evidence flies in the face of uncontroverted physical
67
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facts also in evidence that the opinion must give
way to the fact, and that the opinions of witnesses
are not properly admissible where the issue may
be resolved by persons of common knowledge and
understanding who have possession of the facts.
Ruping v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 51 Utah
480, 171 P. 145.

* * *
''Accordingly, we conclude that the questioned
findings of the trial court as to the cause of death
of the deseased insured is sustained by the evidence, and we may not interfere with such finding.''
Carpenter v. Syrett, 99 Utah 208, 104 Pac. 2d 617:
''Where different conclusions may be reasonably drawn by different minds from the same
evidence, the decision must be left to the jury.
McStay v. Citizens' National Trust & Savings
Bank of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. App. 2d 595, 43 P.
2d 560; Pollard v. Broadway Central Hotel Corporation, 353 Ill. 312, 187 N. E. 487. And as said
by this court in Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37
Utah 520, 109 P. 817, 820: 'If the evidence and
the inferences are of the character which would
authorize reasonable men to arrive at different
conclusions with respect to whether all the essential facts were or were not proven, the question
is one of fact and not of law. This is so although
the evidence on some points may be very unsatisfactory or doubtful.' ''
Spackman v. Benefit Ass 'n, 97 Utah 91, 89 Pac. 2d
490:

"In so far as external appearances were concerned witnesses described the lesion or injury
as having the appearance of, or being like, the
'bite of an insect or sting of a bee'. Three lay
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

witnesses so testified. This was the expression
of an opinion or a descriptive appearance constituting a generalization of matters of common
kno·wledge. Xo other description or explanation
\Yas offered.
"X egatiYely, it was said the lesion did not
have the appearance of a pimple or boil. The
physicians ventured the opinion that it would be
impossible to determine from the descriptions
giYen what the cause of the infection was. No
other or different explanation or theory of the
origin of the infection was suggested or given
than that it was like a bite of an insect or bee
sting. Two witnesses testified there was an opening in the center of the leison. The doctor, who
examined it and treated it, said he did not see
such opening. That was a matter for the jury.

* * *
"We think the evidence sufficient to require
us to say we cannot disturb the verdict as it was
based upon a permissible inference from the evidence properly submitted.''
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320; 81 Pac.
2d 359:

,.

"If there was any substantial evidence from
which the jury could find that John Crus gave
this money to the defendant, Anne Crus, during
his lifetime then the court erred in directing a.
verdict for the plaintiff. In Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 P. 856, this court said (page
863) : 'If there was any substantial evidence upon
which the jury could find for the plaintiffs under
the pleadings, the court erred in directing the
veridct.' And in Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37
Utah 520, 109 P. 817, the court said (page 820):
'The test is whether or not there is some sub-

69

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stantial evidence in support of every essential
fact which a plaintiff is required to prove in
order to entitle him to recover. If the evidence
and the inferences are of the charcter which
would authorize reasonable men to arrive at different conclusions with respect to whether all
essential facts were or were not proven, then the
question is one of fact and not of law.' And in
Green v. 1-Iigbee, 66 Utah 539, 244 P. 906, the
court said (page 908) : 'A verdict should not be
directed for defendant, unless all reasonable men
would draw the same conclusion from the evidence, and that conclusion would require a verdict for the defendant.' To the same effect, see
Nelson v. Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17 P. 2d 292."
Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 Pac. 2d 1:
"Where two or more inferences may be
drawn even from uncontradicted evidence, it is
still a matter for the fact finder. Such is not the
case where the facts are not disputed and only
one inference may be made. In that case it would
be incumbent upon the court to apply the law
to the uncontested fact and in a jury trial direct
a verdict. ' '
Now let us take a look at the evidence on this subject matter. Plaintiff's evidence, brought out on crossexamination without objection, shows that all of her
rear molars were extracted many years ago-twenty to
thirty years, when she was a young woman. One of
the dentists who may have extracted one or more of
those teeth was a Dr. Morgan, now deceased. Her dentist since 1935 has been Dr. Wright of Murray, Utah.
When Mrs. Fredrickson's deposition was taken she
was asked as to any teeth that had been pulled and
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when. She said the rear nwlars. upper and lower, were
pulled twenty or thirty years ago; that Dr. Wright
might haYe pulled two or three teeth (not molars) after
1935 or maybe he didn't pull any. \Vhen Dr. Wright
was on the stand he produced his records showing that
he pulled no teeth for the plaintiff until January 1946
(all front teeth); used no gauze or sponges in her mouth;
and that his work prior to that time consisted of cleaning her teeth and filling a few cavities.
Upon this evidence counsel says that Dr. Morgan
is the one who left the gauze packs in her throat, or that
it is equally probable that he did do so; hence, he says,
the case should have been taken from the jury.
The only evidence is that the rear molars were
pulled twenty or thirty years ago and that Dr. Morgan
was one of the dentists who extracted one or more of
them. This is all that the evidence shows.
Upon these two facts counsel says that the trial
court should have taken the case from the jury. He
asked the trial court to make the following inferences
upon inferences: (1) That two of the rear molars extracted twenty or thirty years ago were dry sockets
or bleeders; and upon that inference to make the further inference that the dentist or dentists (either Dr.
Morgan or someone else) packed the sockets with gauze
packs; and upon those inferences infer that he or they
left two packs in the sockets; and upon those inferences
to infer that, if they were lower molars, that such packs
either moved in mass through the jawbone into the
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throat; or that such hypothetical packs, if left in the
lower molars, moved upwards out of the sockets (which
they say it couldn't do) into the mouth and then reentered the mouth tissue and moved in mass to the
tonsil area; or as an alternate to this hypothesis that it
wasn't two lower molars at all but two rear upper
molars and that two such packs, inferred to have been
used, inferred to have been left, and inferred to have
remained there for twenty or thirty years without any
one knowing about it, came out of the upper sockets
into the mouth, reentered the mouth tissue in mass and
then moved in mass downward to the tonsil area; or
perhaps he suggests that it moved laterally out through
the jaw bone encasing the socket. More than that he is
asking the court, in order to erect this straw man~o
infer that two such packs were left, one on either side,
and that after twenty or thirty years of having been
imbedded as two masses of cotton gauze in her teeth,
without her knowledge or any infectious manifestations
of their presence for such a long period of time, that
they finally arrived at the tonsil area simultaneously
just at the psychological moment to appear as lump~
in her throat and become gatherers and spreaders of
infection immediately following Dr. Maw's operation.
And this in spite of the evidence of Mrs. Fredrickson,
Betty Fredrickson, Mrs. Mathews and Mrs. Rupp that
it was gauze that came out of her throat. It certainly
retained its form and texture for a long time if it had
come out of tooth sockets and been in her throat for
twenty or thirty years.
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I'i

1

Xot even Dr. ~law's loyal professiOnal friends suggested any such nonsense. It was not even testified to
by Dr. :J[aw. The latter took two positions. In the first
place he said it wasn't g·auze at all but undigested food
matter. The City Chen1ist ans\Yered that proposition
and Dr. :Jiaw hirnself finally admitted (R. 470) that it
was cotton threads but said it wasn't the kind he used.
He then said her dentists were responsible but didn't
say how. That was ans\\·ered by I\Irs. Fredrickson and
:Jlr. Fredrickson who testified that no gauze packs had
ever been used in her mouth by any dentist and by Dr.
\Y right and Dr. Browning themselves.
Counsel would have all of these inferences rest one
upon the other without a word of evidence to support
them, and yet he says that this wholly imaginary setup,
purely a figment of counsel's imagination, was sufficient to destroy the case against Dr. Maw.
It will be noted that defendant did not request the
trial court to give any instruction to the jury upon
any such absurd theory. In the presentation of evidence
he was given the widest latitude to try to develop a
solid basis for such a theory if he could do so but, when
he got through, all he had was the fact that the rear
teeth had been pulled twenty or thirty years ago. Dr.
:Jiaw himself said that prior to his operation her throat
was normal, without evidence of prior surgery and that
she showed no abonmal throat condition. He even examined her sinus and found it clear.
What a fertile imagintion counsel has, when he
can build all of this upon the one fact that plaintiff had
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had her rear molars pulled twenty or thirty years ago
and that one of her earlier dentists was named Dr. Morgan. When they have to hang their hat on that one nail,
driven into nothing more substantial than counsel's
vivid imagination as to inferences upon inferences as
to what he imagines might have occurred twenty or
thirty years ago, they have a weak basis for asking
this court to apply the doctrine of the Tremelling case,
or any other case.
Counsel for defendant has quoted copiously from
the evidence of defendant and his witnesses on issues
where there was a conflict between the direct and
opinion evidence of defendant and the circumstantial
evidence of plaintiff. The jury resolved that conflict in
the evidence against defendant and yet he quotes such
evidence as though it were established facts in the case.
A good example of this is the statement of defendant and his witnesses that a piece of gauze placed in
the tonsil fossa could not remain there longer than a
few days-not over thirty days-and certainly not
longer than sixty days. In fact two of defendant's experts, Dr. Snow and Dr. Cleary, stated that if two
pieces of gauze exuded from the two points indicated
by Dr. Dolowitz in plaintiff's throat on the dates indicated, to-wit, June 26, 1948, and November 15, 1948,
that in their opinion they had to have been placed in
the throat of plaintiff at those same places not over
thirty-and certainly not over sixty-days prior to
their emission. This was in conflict with the established
fact that there had been no surgery in her throat since
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the tonsillectomy. In expressing this opiniOn the doctors completely overlooked the fact that for more than
thirty days or even sixty days prior to those dates she
had been under the eonstant observation and treatment
of Dr. Dolowitz who did no surgery in her throat beyond the taking of biopsies which loosened the gauze so
that it could come out and disclose the cause of the
trouble that had been infecting her throat and causing
fear of cancer since the date of the tonsillectomy.
Counsel completely disregards the direct evidence
that no one but Dr. Maw had ever performed surgery
in her throat before or after the tonsillectomy.
He completely disregards the admissions of his
own experts on cross-examination that the tonsil fossa
can be shallow or deep, as much as 5/8ths of an inch
in normal cases and as much as 3/4ths of an inch in
diseased cases; that the tonsils rest in a deep red sac;
and that in cases of imbedded tonsils the incision can
go into the tissue outside of and beyond the tonsil fossa;
and that there is also a practice of some physicians in
cases of excessive bleeding to suture a gauze pack in
the tonsil fossa and remove it later, which practice is
rejected and ''damned'' by the medical profession, but
which is nevertheless sometimes done.
He also completely disregards the fact that while
defendant and his experts said packs of gauze in the
throat will not remain longer than thirty or sixty days
so far as doctors are concerned, he nevertheless argues
that they remain there for twenty or thirty years if a
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dentist is to be the victim. Juries don't have to believe
such evidence-and this one did not.
It is no wonder the jury, and particularly the juror
Emery, did not believe such sophistry.

When Drs. Snow and Cleary said that these masses
of cotton threads had to have been placed in plaintiff's
throat not over thirty-and certainly not over sixtydays prior to the dates of emission from the ulcers in
plaintiff's throat, they manifested a magnificent example
of how far they were willing to go in their professional
loyalty to a brother in distress, but they thereby condemned their evidence to disbelief in the light of the
positive evidence of everyone, including Dr. Dolowitz
who had had plaintiff under treatment since May 10,
1948, that no such thing had occurred; hence their testimony that it, medically, had to have occurred within
thirty or sixty days was not believed by the jury, and
properly so. It was contrary to the established facts,
and unbelievble.
And yet counsel, in the face of this, states as a fact
that Dr. Maw couldn't have left the gauze there because it wouldn't have remained over a few days if he
had. He completely ignores the conflicting evidence
that it did happen and did remain.
Counsel also makes much of the fact that the ulcerR
from which the gauze exuded was not directly on the
tonsil area. The ulcers from which the gauze finally
exuded were the last ulcers, excepting some minor ones
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fron1 which threads were still coming out practically to
the tin1e of trial. He completely ignores the evidence
that her throat was sore and ulcerated at different
points during the "Whole period from the date of the
tonsillectomy, some of which ulcers were right in the
tonsil hole. They would come and go, only to reappear
or appear in different places. The infection spread
throughout her entire mouth.
Infection, as stated by Dr. Dolowitz, is a result of
bacteria breaking down the healthy tissue and the pressure of nature causes foreign material to seek a way
out through openings made by ulcers. Of course when
the biopsies were taken by Dr. Dolowitz the capsulated
condition was relieved and they appered on the surface
where the enlarged opening was made by him. He RO
testified.

It isn't a question of where the gauze packs and
threds came out. They migrate with the infection and
pressure. The question is, where did they go in and
who put them there~ That was a jury question under
the conflicting evidence, both direct and circumstantial.
Malpractice cases are not few, even in this jurisdietion. ~[ost of them involve diagnosis and treatment
"·here expert evidence is necessary to sustain a judgment. This is not such a case. No expert evidence is
required in cases involving the leaving of a sponge or
piece of gauze in the body of a patient, in the absence
of some showing that the operation was of such character as to require it. No such issue is involved here.
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The leaving of gauze or sponges in this case was not
attempted to be justified. It was condemned as an improper practice. The only defense attempted to be presented was that Mr. Maw didn't do it.
On that issue a doctor stands before the court and
jury the same as any other defendant who says he didn't
do a thing for which he is charged, but the evidence
says that he did.
In malpractice cases of this kind not involving or
calling for expert evidence, it is not uncommon for the
doctor to say that he didn't do it; that he couldn't have
left the sponge because he put hemostats on his sponges
or that he counted them; or that the negligence was that
of the nurses, or some assistant; or that some other
doctor had attended the patient before or after the
operation who also could have left the sponge; or that
the patient was sick anyway and the same thing would
have occurred even if he had removed the sponge; or
that there are many causes that could have contributed
to the result .
.All of these cases have to rest more or less on circumstantial evidence. The patient doesn't know what
actually occurred. Usually she is unconscious or so
situated that she can't see. She wouldn't know if she
could see, because surgery is something that she wouldn't
know about, whether it was proper or improper. A
patient wouldn't know how deep or how extensive the
incision was, or should be ; whether the tonsil was imbedded and the incision went beyond the tonsil fossa;
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or whether there were gauze packs sutured in the incision. They are simply told what to do and when to come
back. They follow their instructions. In the meantime
scar tissue forms over the incision and all they know
is that they are sick; that it feels like there is a lump
in their throat; that ulcers form and the mouth is sore
everywhere from the infection; they are fed endless
doses of sulfa and penicillin to control or eliminate the
infection; and eventually the gauze is exuded and healing takes place. They know that only one doctor has
worked where the gauze is found. They must prove
their case by circumstantial evidence. In the cases cited
above the courts have held that when the patient has
done that in this kind of a case it is for the jury to say
whether the doctor did it.
Counsel says that it was incumbent on plaintiff to
show that the pieces of gauze migrated from the tonsil
fossa to the places of emission. There was no such
burden on plaintiff. Her burden was to show where it
went in and who did it. She carried this burden and
excluded, by her evidence, all other probable sources.
No one other than Dr. Maw performed any surgery in
her throat, before of since. She did not know what Dr.
Maw did. She did not know whether he found imbedded
tonsils and went beyond the tonsil area or whether
he got excessive bleeding and sutured the gauze in as a
temporary measure, intending to remove it later, and
then forgot to do so; or whether it was some pieces that
got caught in the suturing and then got covered over
with scar tissue. A patient never knows what a doctor
does. She did know that he made an incision and used
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gauze sponges and sutures and that she had a lump in
her throat immediately afterwards at the place of operation, and that from then on to the time the pieces of
gauze came out she had ulcers and abscesses in her
throat, some of which were right in the hole of the tonsil.
Infection spread throughout her mouth and throat. Dr.
Dolowitz testified that the gauze was the source of
infection. It was, therefore, a question of who put the
gauze in there. Counsel makes much of the marks placed
on exhibit 1 (the enlarged diagram of the mouth) by
Dr. Dolowitz. Prior to the exuding of the gauze through
ulcers at the points indicated, plaintiff's mouth and
throat had ulcers at other places, including right in
the tonsil hole. The tonsil pillars do not define the size
of the fossa. As stated by Dr. Snow (R. 425) there may
be only a small part of the tonsil showing within the
pillars. The tonsils may be large, in which case, of
course, the fossa are larger than the extremeties of the
pillars. They may even extend through the fossa into
the tissue beyond.
When Mrs. Frederickson established by her evidence
that Dr. Maw was the only one who used gauze sponges
there and immediately afterward she had a lump in
her throat which finally turned out to be gauze sponges,
there is certainly more than a fair inference that defendant put them there.
There is no dispute that these pieces of gauze caused
ulcers, abscesses and sores right from the start, exactly
as the doctors said they should. They also said that
infection caused the ulcers and abscesses and that pres-
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sure of nature in trying to expel the foreign body caused
them to moYe. In addition we must remember that Dr.
Dolowitz had taken several biopsies from those areas
which caused them to come out where he had made the
openings.
At page 62 of counsel's brief is a statement which
we challenge. He says, ''The nearest ulcers were but
1 to 2 inches distant from the tonsil fossae.'' Counsel
gives no reference to the record in making that statement. There is no such evidence. On the contrary the
record is replete with evidence that the ulcers were
occurring right in the tonsil area-in fact right in the
hole of the tonsil. We give the following page references: Mrs. Fredrickson: R. 99, 104, 108, 110, 111, 112,
146, 147, 148. Read the record as to where the ulcers
were.
Dr. Dolowitz was asked by counsel for defendants
to place on Exhibit 1 (an enlarged illustration of the
mouth-not Mrs. Fredrickson's mouth) the location of
the ulcers from which the two gauze sponges and several
thread were exuded. He did not see the gauze sponges
come out. The ulcers had been enlarged by his biopsies.
He stated very candidly that in placing the marks on
the illustration he was just giving an approximation (R.
202). He was testifying from memory with the aid of
his notes. He first testified that the left ulcer was about
midway between the anterior pillar of the tonsil and
the last upper tooth (R. 186-190). He then said it was
closer to the tooth. Later he testified that on October
25, 1948 he found this ulcer healing ''just lateral to the
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fossa" (R. 191). As to the right ulcer he testified that
he found two lesions, ''there was a slightly healing of
the wounds, what type I couldn't testify, on the right side
over the tonsil area'' (R. 191), midway between the
right anterior pillar and the last tooth. He was asked to
read his notes on what he found on the right side on
November 15, 1948 (R. 507). They are as follows:
"Patient comes in reporting that on the 8th
of November a large mass of material sluffed
out of the right side of the throat at the pole of
the tonsil slightly backward, that is my way of
putting it, slightly behind the pole area, 'and
upward toward the upper teeth. A large pocket
was formed and she reported to Dr. Argyle. She
brings in some material which she recovered
from her stool believing it to be the material
she swallowed. I am unable to tell her what it
is composed of, and suggested if she really wishes
to know to contact a laboratory. The hole is almost healed though there is still some infection.
At the site of the granulation that I removed
on the first there is one thread that I removed.
No other foreign body seen. There was some pus
surrounding this. She insists there is still further
foreign body deeper in. To continue hot packs
and icthyol packs. Advise against probing for
further material at this time.
This doesn't sound as though the ulcers were 1 to
2 inches away from the tonsil area.
Dr. E. W. Browning saw her condition in 1947.
Counsel asked him expressly if the ulceration that he
saw was not removed from the tonsil area (R. 313).
Here is the testimony of Dr. Browning elicited by counsel for defendant:
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"'Yell, no, no it wouldn't removed from it
because, as I say, you haven't too ;much distance
from here to her, you are getting over the tonsil
area.
'' Q. When you say 'over the tonsil area'
you are pointing to the left 1

•' A. To the left, to the soft palate covering
the tonsil fossa.
'' Q. Now, the tonsil fossa means an indentation, doesn't it 1

''A.

fossa simply

That is right.

''Q. The tonsil, when it is in place, sets in
that indentation, that is correct, isn't it~
''A. That is right.''
Dr. ~law, himself, on cross-examination (R. 473)
stated that the ulcer on the left side as indicated by
Dr. Dolo"'"i.tz was within half an inch of the anterior
pillar of the tonsil.
That evidence doesn't sound like the nearest ulcer
was 1 to 2 inches from the tonsil fossa. The whole
mouth, throat, cheeks and gums were infected. The infection spread everywhere, and so did the threads and
string - particularly after doctors took several biopsies
and thereby loosened the tissue. They were being pressed
out toward any opening created by an ulcer of a knife.
Again we state, it isn't a question of where they
~arne out. It is a question of where they went in and
who put them there.
"

There was only one man who put an incision in
1\irs. Fredrickson's throat. That man was Dr. Maw.
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The jury so found and there was substantial evidence to
support the finding.
POINT NO.3
This point is directed to the alleged error in instruction No. 12 with reference to the measure of damages. The jury was told that they should determine the
nature, extent and severity of the damages and the
temporary or permanent character thereof. Counsel
says that this permitted a recovery for permanent injuries and that there is no evidence thereof.
Our answer to this proposition is (1) that there was
plenty of evidence of permanent injuries, and (2) that
the verdict is not excessive and shows no allowance for
permanent injuries which should warrant a reversal of
the verdict on that ground.

Mrs. Fredrickson and her witnesses testified that
she felt the lumps in her throat immediately following
the operation; complained of the condition to Dr. Maw,
Dr. Muirhead, Dr. Boucher, Dr. Argyle, Dr. Browning,
Dr. Hatch, Dr. Wright and everyone else who would
listen to her; and finally to Dr. Dolowitz ~ho was responsible for the biopsies which permitted the gauze to
come out. She and her witnesses testified that she had
a sore throat, ulcers and abscesses throughout her throat
and mouth from the time of her operation to the time
of trial over four years later. They testified that this
infection spread to her gums and even appeared in an
abscess behind the ear on one occasion. The abscesses
and ulcers came and went, which was natural in view
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of the fact that every doctor, including Dr. Maw was
prescribing sulfa and penieillin for control and elimination of the infection, but which did not remove the
cause. These constant and continuous dosages of sulfa
and penicillin were probably the reason for the infection
failing to sooner bring the gauze to the surface.
During this time cancer \Yas a natural thought, since
no one could find out what the source or cause of the
infection was. It "~as first suggested by Dr. Maw. He
said it didn't look good. He called in Dr. Hatch. They
told her they didn't think it was cancer; but nevertheless
the sores, ulcers and abscesses persisted and spread
throughout her mouth. She was terrified. Each new
doctor suspected and suggested the possibility of cancer.
So did Dr. Browning and Dr. Sears, so they sent her
to Dr. Dolowitz, who also suspected cancer. Is it any
wonder that she lost 60 pounds in weight, became sick
physically and mentally; that the relations between herself and her family became strained. They regarded
her as a mental subject and she was regarded with
suspicion by her family. Her mouth was foul and offensive, with a bad odor, and diseased. The only evidence of recovery was that her mental and physical
health had improved.
She testified that she was getting no relief or satisfaction from Dr. Maw or the Clinic and she naturally
suspected that her teeth might be the source of the
trouble. She didn't know that the cause lay imbedded in
some gauze left there in her throat by the only individual that ever performed any surgery there. So she
.85

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

went to her dentist, Dr. Wright. He was as helpless
in his inability to diagnose her difficulty as the rest of
the doctors. He said he couldn't say for sure whether
it might be her teeth. It might or might not be. He left
it up to her to decide, which was his practice in case::;
of doubt. In leaving the ultimate decision to the patient
he followed the same practice as Dr. Maw and Dr.
Tyndale. In the initial diagnosis of plaintiff's condition they felt that the tonsils might be the cause of her
arthritis but they left it to her to decide as to whether
they should be removed. She decided to try it, since it
was at least a chance for recovery, which was more than
she had been able to get from the doctors, including
Dr. Maw and the Clinic. So her front teeth were drawn
in the faint and futile hope that it would be a solution.
But that too was ineffectual. The cause was not there.
It lay deeper in the gauze imbedded in her throat.
Only after the cause and source of the infection
was found did she and the doctors find the truth.
But in the meantime she suffered four years of
physical, mental, and social distress, including the permanent loss of her teeth-all to no purpose-in her
frantic efforts to find the cause of her trouble.
Counsel states that this was no evidence of permanent injury. We have never heard of teeth coming
back in at the age of 54; and who are we to say that her
mental and physical health was not impaired, at least to
some degree, permanently. For four years she had
those pieces of gauze in her throat, as collecting and
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breeding places for bacteria and infection, sending their
pus into her system and particularly her mouth, gums
and teeth.
The evidence as to the loss of her teeth and the
reason for their withdrawal was not objected to nor
was there any motion made by counsel for it to be
stricken as an element of damages.
If there were any dispute or uncertainty as to
whether the infection in the mouth was the cause of
removal of the teeth, counsel himself removed that doubt.
He asked the question of Mrs. Matthews (R. 250) and
she said it was because of the sore throat. He asked
~Ir. Fredrickson why she had her teeth removed (R.
265). His answer was as follows: ''Because she had
a bad condition in her throat.'' He asked the same
question of Dr. Wright (R. 339) and was told that it
was because she was having trouble and thought the
teeth might be the cause.
There are some injuries that are objective in character and are in the very nature of themselves permanent in character. Loss of a portion of the body and
disfigurement are of that type. The jury knows they
are permanent without being told by a doctor.
Counsel says there was no casual connection shown
between the malpractice of Dr. Maw and the extraction
of the teeth. He says the teeth were removed because
of pyorrhea. Pyorrhea is the result of infection. Dr.
Wright did not testify that he took the teeth out because of pyorrhea. He said he took them out because
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of the diseased condition of her throat in the hope that
it might help.
The fact that both Dr. Wright and Mrs. Fredrickson
may have been in error in this decision is not a matter
that Dr. Maw can complain about. They had a condition created by Dr. Maw that none of the doctors had
been able to diagnose or treat because the existence of
the foreign body in the throat was not known then. Even
Dr. Maw had been erroneously treating it for sinus
infection.
This is a similar situation to the one considered by
this court in Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 73 Utah 535, 275 Pac. 777.
In that case an injured man went to a doctor who
erroneously diagnosed his condition as rheumatism and
recommended he have his teeth out, which he did. It
subsequently developed that his back was injured and
that his teeth had nothing to do with his condition .
.This court held that the loss of the teeth was a compensable injury arising out of the accident for which
allowance should be made.
It is, in any event, ,very evident in this case that the
jury made no substantial allowance for permanent injuries. The verdict of $5,000 for over four years of
physical and mental suffering, humiliation and terror of
cancer, is certainly not excessive. In fact it was niggardly. She should have had many times that amount.
Dr. Maw was the first one to put the cancer thought in
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her mind when he saw an ulcer near the root of her
tongue and asked for a sample for analysis. She asked
if he suspected cancer and he said he wouldn't say it
was but it didn't look good. From then on to the time
when Dr. Dolowitz uncoYered the hidden gauze cancer
\vas the first thing that each new doctor suspected, and
it \Yas the thing that· caused Drs. Browning and Sears
to send her to Dolowitz. As .Jirs. Fredrickson said, she
was in a state of mortal terror throughout this entire
time. Certainly defendant was not prejudiced by this instruction because the jury allowed only a very nominal
amount for such terrible injuries.
Anything that counsel for plaintiff failed to ask
in the way of connecting up the loss of the teeth with
the throat condition was well taken care of by counsel
for defendant.

:tH
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It is not claimed In this case that the verdict is
excessive, because it obviously is not. No such contention is made. The error, if any there were, is purely
technical. Inclusion of the words, ''if any'' in the instruction had the effect of leaving it to the jury to
determine the nature and extent of the damages as
shown by the evidence. In other instructions the jury
\Yas told that in considering this question they should
note be guided by sympathy or prejudice and that they
should consider only the evidence introduced in the case.

jWfi1

:fll'
taJII~
t-·~
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Where the verdict is not excessive and no error
is assigned upon the ground that the verdict is excessive
under the evidence, the appellate court will not regard
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any such purported error as prejudicial, even though
it were to be technically so, which in this case it is not.
The general principle is well stated in 5 C. J. Sec.
1146 (Sec. 1773b, Appeal and Error), as follows:
''Erroneous instructions as to the measure
of damages or the amount of recovery do not
consitute a ground for reversal where it is apparent that the jury were not influenced or misled
thereby. Error in instructions will be considered
harmless where * * * the amount awarded was
fully justified by the evidence, was not excessive, or was for a smaller amount than the evidence showed or tended to show plaintiff was
en titled to ; ''
The authorities uniformly hold that where the appealing party does not claim or establish that the verdict is excessive that no prejudicial error is shown, even
though it were to be shown that the instruction is technically erroneous.
Barlow v. S. L. & U. R. Co., 57 Utah 312, 194 Pac.
665.
The court in its instruction on the measure of
damages said they might consider the cost of nursing,
with reference to which there was no evidence. The
verdict was not excessive and this court refused to
reverse the case on that technical ground.
''In instructing on the measure of damages
the court informed the jury that if the verdict
was in her favor plaintiff was entitled to such
damages as would compensate her for all pain,
suffering, and distress of mind and body, if any
90
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which she had endured, or which she would endure in the future as a result of such accident;
also injuries to her person received by her, if
any, as a result of such accident; also for any
pennanent injuries sustained by her, if any, as
a result thereof, together with all reasonable and
necessary expense, if any, as shown by the evidence, which she paid or incurred for nursing
and for medical expense in her attempt to relieve
herself of the injuries sustained, and also any
necessary and reasonable sum which she paid in
removing herself fron1 the place of injury to her
residence, and from all the facts and circumstances as shown by the evidence to award plaintiff such an amount as would compensate her for
all of the injuries and damages by her sustained.
Xo evidence whatever was introduced showing
the respondent paid anything for nursing or incurred any expense therefor. The jury knew
what the evidence was, knew that nothing had
been paid for nursing, and that there was no
evidence of any obligation having been incurred
therefor. There is no reason for thinking that
when $2,999 was decided upon as the proper
amount of respondent's damages an imaginary
and conjectural amount for nursing was included.
Technically the court erred in referring to expense of nursing. Nevertheless, we do not think
that with the qualifying words 'if any' the instruction could possibly be misleading. Bergstrom v. Mellen, 192 Pac. 679. ''
This was substantially what was held by this court
in Olsen v. Kress, 87 Utah 51; 48 Pac. (2d) 430. No one
testified in that case as to future pain and suffering.
The trial court included that element in the instruction
on the question of damages but inserted the words "if
any'' as a part of the instruction. Counsel for defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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excepted to the instruction on the ground that there
was no evidence to sustain the same. The trial court,
however, instructed the jury, as it did in this case, that
they should be guided solely by the evidence in that regard. This court refused to reverse the case upon that
ground.
"On the question of damages the trial court
instructed the jury that they must first determine whether plaintiff suffered a miscarriage as
a proximate result of the accident. If they found
that she did not so suffer, then they should not
include any damages for miscarriage or for any
pain and suffering therefrom, but only such pain
and suffering and impairment of ability as may
have resulted independent of the miscarriage,
and they should then 'only take into consideration such bodily pain and suffering caused by
such injuries, if any, as you may believe have
been shown to have resulted proximately from
the accident or which in the future you believe
she may sttf/er. If you believe from the evidence
she may suIf er any pain in the future.' Defendant excepts to this instruction for the reason
that there is no evidence to support future pain
and suffering unless the miscarriage was caused
by the accident. However, the evidence shows
that plaintiff's leg was bruised and she had
pains all around the lower part of her body and
back and that these pains have continued.
Whether these injuries and pains were connected
solely with the miscarriage and so should not be
considered if the miscarriage were eliminated
from consideration was a question of fact which
the jury should pass upon. The trial court could
not, nor can this court say, as a matter of law,
that these injuries and pains were a part of the
injuries and pains growing out of or insepar-
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ately connected with the nnscarriap;P.
there would be future pain resulting
injuries other than those incident to
earriage was like\\~ise a question for
\\-e see no error in this instruction."

Whether
from the
the misthe jury.

Briley v. \Yhite, ·----- Ark. ______ , 193 S.\Y. (2d) 326.
The court gave a general instruction on the measure
of damages in a personal injury action similar to the
one in the case at bar. Defendant assigned error on the
ground that there \Yas no evidence of permanent injury.
The appellate court refused to reverse the case upon
the ground where it \\~as not claimed or shown that the
verdict was excessive.
"vVhile attending physicians expressed the
opinion that the boy would haYe normal use of
his leg upon complete healing, which admittedly
had not taken place at the time of the trial, there
was substantial testimony from which the jury
might have inferred that his injury was more
than a temporary one. Furthermore, it cannot
be said with certainty that when the shock of
such an injury, the slowness of the healing process, the pain and suffering undergone by the
appellee, and his loss of a year's school work are
considered the jury's verdict was grossly excessive, even if no permanent damage to the leg was
shown. In this view of the matter, the instruction complained of, even though objectionable,
was not prejudicial. Dallas & Gulf R. Co. v.
Steel, 108 Ark. 14, 156 S.W. 182, Ann. Cas.
1915B 198.
See also the following authorities to the same effect:
Hecker v. Union Cab Co., 134 Ore. 385, 293 Pac. 726.
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Ball v. Gessner, 185 Minn. 105, 240 N.W. 100.
Romann v. Bender, 190 Minn. 419, 252 N.W. 80.
Snyder v. Western Union, (Mo. App.) 277 S.W. 362.

J acklich v. Starks, 338 Ill. A.pp. 433, 87 N.E. 2d
802.
It is a jury question as to whether injuries involving mental and physical distress and illness resulting in
great loss of weight is or is not of a permanent nature.
This in addition to the loss of teeth fully justified the
trial court in giving instruction No. 12 in leaving to
the jury to determine the question and include an allowance therefor if it so found. There was no prejudicial
error, particularly where no claim is made that the
verdict is excessive, which it obviously is not.
POINTS 4 AND 5
These points have to do with the propriety of the
trial court's ruling on the right of defendant, upon
cross-examination of Dr. Dolowitz, to go into matters
not covered by the direct examination, namely, his professional opinion as to whether gauze left in the tonsil
area could travel to the place of ulceration from which
gauze, threads, or strings were removed by him and by
Mrs. Fredrickson as told to him by Mrs. Fredrickson.
Objections to the questions were made by plaintiff
upon the ground that it was not proper cross-examination as the subject matter had not been covered in the
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direct examination. The trial court sustained the objection and thereafter defendants called Dr. Dolowitz
as their witness and the subject matter was covered by
defendants by the same witness as a part of defendants'
case.
To these points plaintiff says:
(a)

The trial court was right in its rulings; and

(b) If there was any error, which plaintiff denies,
it was not prejudicial.
A reading of the direct examination of Dr. Dolowitz as plaintiff's witness shows that he was asked only
to state the facts as he found them and what he saw and
did. He was nowhere asked for his professional opinion
as to the source of the foreign substances, whether they
arrived at the point of ulceration from the tonsil area
or any other place by migration or whether they wer~
originally deposited there by someone.
It will be noted that the discussion of these points
is presented by appellant without citation of authority.
Counsel either found no authorities sustaining their
position or found them adverse to their contention. The
principle involved is not new. The cross-examination
may not go beyond the scope of the subject matter
covered by the direct examination. Any rna tters and
things tending to vary, contradict, modify or explain
the direct examination may be covered by the crossexamination.
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Dr. Dolowitz was called as any other witness to
testify as to facts. The fact that his relationship to
plaintiff was shown as physician and patient was shown
not for the purpose of qualifying him as an expert to
express an opinion but to show the circumstances under
which he learned and observed the facts to which he
was testifying.
The applicable rule of law is well stated in 58 Am.
Juris. 474 (Witnesses Sec. 844) as follows:
''In the event an expert witness has testified
to facts observed by him, and not to his opinion
based thereon, he caJl'l!not be cross-examined as to
his professional opinion, nor will questions be
allowed to be put to him which tend merely to
discredit him, and in no way affect the value
of his testimony.''

The cited authority is Enos v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins.
Co., (S. D.) 57 N.W. 919. The case is in point and sustained the announced principle.
The extent and character of cross-examination to
be permitted under the announced limitation is in the
sound discretion of the trial court, and its rulings will
not be a ground of reversal unless abuse of discretion
is shown.
Malia v. Seeley, 89 Utah 262, 57 Pac. (2d) 357.
Anderson v. S. L. & 0. Ry., 35 Utah 509, 101 Pac.
579.
The general principle that the cross-examination
may not go beyond the scope of the direct examination
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is announced and ap-plied by this court in the following
cases:
Tuft

Y.

Brotherson, 106 Utah 499, 150 Pac. (2d) 384.

State v. :Murphy, 92 Utah 382, 68 Pac. (2d) 188.
State v. Bruno, 97 Utah 33, 92 Pac. (2d) 1103.
Jensen v. Kress, 87 Utah 434, 49 Pac. (2d) 958.
Dr. Dolowitz subsequently appeared as an expert
witness for defendants and expressed his opinions on
the same subject matter attempted to be covered on
cross-examination. Defendant was not prejudiced If
there were any error, which we deny, it was harmless
and was cured by the subsequent evidence of Dr. Dolowitz.
Malia v. Seeley, 89 Utah 262, 57 Pac. (2d) 357.
In re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 Pac. (2d) 602.
Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Proctor, 58
Idaho 578, 76 Pac. (2d) 438.
Radermacher v. Radermacher, 59 Idaho 716, 87
Pac. (2d) 461.
Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah 21, 290
Pac. 970.
Thompson v. Bown Livestock Co., 74 Utah 1, 276
Pac. 651.
Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 Pac. (2d) 1073.
Apparently these points were thrown in by appellants in a wild hope that this court had forgotten fundaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mental principles of law; or perhaps it was to give this
court a little extra work; or again it may have been a
desperate chance in a hopeless case in the thought that
someone might, notwithstanding the law, "hang their
hat on it" to give them a new trial.
It seems to have been "thrown m for what it is
worth'', which is nothing.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff, Mrs. Fredrickson, was the victim of
malpractice. It was uncontradicted that there were two
pieces of gauze sponge-one on either side-left in her
throat. They exuded through incisions made by Dr.
Dolowitz in removing some large ulcers in taking deep
biopsies to determine if she had cancer. These sponges
were loose weave surgical gauze, seen and identified as
such by several witnesses. For four years, commencing
immediately following the tonsil operation performed
by Dr. Maw, she had felt a lump in her throat and had
suffered from ulcers, abscesses and sores in her mouth
and throat. Counsel for defendant, in his address to
the jury, said that whoever left them there .was guilty
of criminal negligence. We hesitate to use such strong
language, but it certainly was grossly careless. Shortly
after the operation Dr. Maw, himself, planted the
thought of cancer. For four years she lived in terror
of that possibility, notwithstanding opinions by Cowan
& Nielson and Dr. Hatch that it was not. E~ach new
doctor or dentist from whom she sought relief from her
diseased and distressful condition, replanted the thought
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of cancer. She lost 60 pounds in weight, and became,
as her husband and friends described her, a nervous
wreck, worrying about the possibility of cancer. She
even contemplated suicide rather than cancer. They
regarded her as mentally unbalanced because of her
insistence that there was a lump in her throat and that
she had not recovered from the effects of the tonsil
operation. Her throat was sore, infected and offensive.
Her mouth had a foul odor and it impaired her relations
with her husband, her family and her grandchildren. In
spite of her infected mouth and throat they thought it
was all imagination on her part and that there was
some other cause for her distress. Finally Dr. Browning and Dr. Sears, suspecting cancer, referred her to
Dr. Dolowitz who, taking deep biopsies, uncovered the
two gauze sponges and made it possible for them to
escape from their imbedded and concealed recesses.

~~

'.(;

~·
f~

Who did that terrible and careless thing~ The jury
said Dr. Maw did it. He was the only one who performed
surgery in her throat before or since. He made an incision on each side, removed a tonsil on each side, used
gauze sponges and catgut sutures on each side, and a
piece of gauze came out on each side. The City Chemist
identified the exuded foreign material as gauze and
catgut after Dr. Maw said it was undigested food; and
the gauze sponges were the cause of her injury and
distress. The mass of threads, cotton and strings were
introduced in evidence, excepting the one from the left
side which was used by the City Chemist for analysis.
Dr. Maw saw it before it was analyzed and said it was
undigested food.

99

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

By the evidence of plaintiff all individuals other
than Dr. Maw were excluded from possible or probable
responsibility. None of them performed any surgery
in her mouth or throat where gauze sponges or catgut
suturing were used. Their efforts were primarily subsequent to the malpractice in an effort to diagnose her
condition and find a remedy. To every one of them she
told her story-always the same-that she had had a
tonsil operation, had a lump in her throat immediately
following it and an ulcerated, abscessed and diseased
condition in her throat and mouth continuously since
the operation. They prescribed sulfa, penicillin and removal of her remaining front teeth as the remedy. It
finally remained for Dr. Dolowitz to find the gauze
sponges, which gave the answer.
Dr. Maw had a fair trial. The evidence was overwhelmingly against him. He shifted his position from
undigested food to the dentists but there was no substantial evidence to back him up. The witnesses closed
all of those avenues of escape for the responsibility for
this oversight or forgetfulness or whatever it was on
the doctor's part that resulted in this malpractice.
The verdict was not excessive. It should have been
much larger.
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH and ELTON,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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